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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role that technology and technology
transfer play in formulating the strategy of a multi-national
engineering consulting firm from the developing countries (FIRM). In
addition, it examines the impact of a technology driven strategy on the
structure of the FIRM.
The literature on MNCs has identified technology as one of the key
strategic resources which a MNC has to own and control. Also, transfer
of technology across subsidiaries has been identified as one of the
fundamental core competencies that a MNC must possess for enhancing its
competitiveness. This thesis establishes that technology as a strategic
resource and technology transfer as a core competence assume greater
roles in the strategy of the FIRM compared to their roles in standard
manufacturing MNCs.
Furthermore, this thesis proposes two technology transfer
mechanisms to be employed by the FIRM. The first mechanism is to be
employed for transferring technologies internally across subsidiaries of
the FIRM while the second mechanism is to be employed for acquiring
external technologies and internalizing them within the FIRM.
Thesis Supervisor:/ D. Eleanor Westney
Title: Associate Professor of Management
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CHAPTER ONE
As the third world countries work hard to develop their societies
and upgrade the standard and quality of life of their populations, they
begin to appreciate the benefits to their development programs that can
result from having home-grown consulting engineering firms in their
regions. This is because professional engineering consulting firms
formed by and staffed with qualified third world professionals in the
various engineering and other technical fields and disciplines stand a
better chance of producing studies, designs and outputs that are more
responsive to the true development needs of these societies than firms
from the developed world.
The major and most valuable asset of any engineering consulting
firm is the trained and qualified human asset (engineers and
technicians) in the fields of engineering in which the firm happens to
be active. Such firms have all their value creation materialize through
the mental efforts of their professionals. Some developing countries
have been fortunate enough to have developed an educational system and
institutions that are able to feed the local or regional firms with
suitably qualified engineers and technicians. In most instances these
human assets are equipped with basic knowledge in their field of
expertise, but they lack the experience, or for that matter the know-
how, to put their basic knowledge into effective use to produce outputs
in the various engineering fields or disciplines. Usually engineering
consulting firms in developing countries acquire (transfer) this
experience, through various mechanisms that are made operational in
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parallel with the actual design and production process. These transfer
mechanisms become increasingly sophisticated as the market develops and
as development projects and programs become more complex and
diversified.
Over the last thirty five years most countries in the Middle East
have developed sound educational systems and institutions which have
been feeding the economies of these countries with suitably qualified
engineers and technicians. In addition, the engineering consulting
industry in the Middle East has successfully used a variety of
technology transfer mechanisms during that period. Now, however, the
industry is in need of more sophisticated transfer mechanisms if
regionally-based firms are to remain competitive. Their technology
transfer mechanisms and the human resource development systems to
support those mechanisms are critical elements of the long term
strategic objectives and posture of the firms in the industry.
This research paper is about technology and technology transfer's
role in the strategy of a multi-national engineering consulting firm in
the Middle East.
Background
As of the early 1950's, the booming economies of the oil producing
countries in the Middle East, especially those of the Arabian Peninsula,
created an urgent and continuously expanding demand for engineering
services in all fields to help move forward the development programs of
these countries. The need for such engineering services has attracted
engineering consulting firms throughout the western world offering their
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expertise in this lucrative new "wild west" of Arabia. Additionally,
this need has helped to create a fertile environment for professionals
from the Middle East to start their own engineering consulting firms
with the objective of contributing to the development process and
capturing their own share of the engineering services market. This,
then, was the main impetus behind the start of the Engineering Design
industry in the Middle East, one which was represented, in the early
stages, by local and regional consulting firms in Lebanon, Iraq and
Egypt.
These young, local engineering consulting firms have gone on to
acquire their technologies (know-how) through various transfer
mechanisms. The core of their professional staff in most of the
required fields of engineering has been either young graduates of the
good universities in the region such as the American University of
Beirut (A.U.B.) and the French St. Joseph University (also in Beirut) or
nationals of Middle Eastern countries who have studied engineering in
Europe or North America.
The acquisition of know-how and the transfer of technology was
achieved by these firms through one or a combination of many of the
following transfer mechanisms:
(1) Employment of professional Arab nationals who have acquired
work experience in Europe or North America in the
engineering fields for which the firms projects have a need.
Also the search for and employment of Arab professionals who
have acquired some construction and/or design experience
9
working for international contractors or consultants in the
oil producing countries.
(2) Securing subcontract assignments from international
engineering consulting firms working on projects in the
Middle East. Such assignments normally started with the
design of simple components of the project, but with time
they extended to the more complex and specialized
components. The strategy of the local firm was then to
carry out a number of successful subcontract assignments in
a particular field of engineering to enable it to establish
a track record of experience that it would eventually use to
seek projects on its own in that field of engineering.
(3) As the local firm gained a substantial amount of experience
and as it established a record of being reliable and quality
conscious firm, it usually started to find that clients were
more willing to award contracts directly to the firm;
provided it brought in an international design firm as a co-
signatory for a joint-venture agreement. This was, at this
stage, quite satisfactory for the local firm since it was
not a subcontractor in the design process but rather a
partner on equal standing with the international design
firm. In this stage of a firm's experience building
process, clients usually preferred joint venture
arrangements, as they made the international design firm
directly and completely liable to them, both technically and
legally, for the entire contract.
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(4) Before the local firm grew out of the joint venture stage
and moves into the stage of complete independence, where it
would carry out assignments on its own in the related field
of expertise or engineering discipline, it might have had to
go through a stage that is normally called the "association"
stage. This is a stage where the local firm is alone
technically and legally responsible for the contract. The
client, however, wants to assure himself that there will not
be any technical deficiency and requests the local firm to
associate with an international design firm whose only
involvement in the contract is to verify the work of the
local firm and ensure its technical soundness and
completeness.
For the purposes of enhancing their reputation and
reducing costs some firms would try to convince their
clients to waive the "association" requirement in return for
a commitment by the firm to hire one or two expatriate
experts to join the design team. These experts would
normally carry out quality control duties for the project as
a whole as well as contribute to the design and project
management of parts of the project.
(5) The last of the transfer mechanisms was the stage where the
local firm was in possession of a solid reputation and
concrete credentials as a firm with the technical and
managerial expertise to perform assignments in the specific
11
engineering discipline to the best possible quality and
comparable to any international standard.
Under such circumstances such firms would have the status and
capability to seek assignments as a prime (main) consultant on large
projects requiring multi-disciplinary design expertise. They would then
have little difficulty in inviting international design firms to perform
certain specialized assignments on a sub-consultant basis or even by the
secondment of professional staff charged on a monthly fee basis.
As a matter of fact, in the case of some local firms, one found
that they were sought by international firms to join forces on the
bidding for, and eventually the design of, major parts of projects. The
reasons for such interest by international design firms was normally due
to the following:
(a) The local firm had the expertise to perform the design of
substantial parts of the project at the highest standard and
yet with costs far below those of the international firm.
This arrangement contributed to the price competitiveness of
the joint bid.
(b) In addition to the established design expertise, the local
firm brought to the design team its knowledge of the local
social and political environments as well as the necessary
knowledge of the preferences that normally would be required
for the delivery of a functional and successful design
product.
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It is important to note that for all of these stages there are
certain assumptions that have been made which enable these local firms
transfer the required know-how. These assumptions are:
(a) The public and private sectors of the countries of the
Middle East, especially the oil producing countries, had the
economic capability to contract out work that generated an
almost continuous flow of design assignments for the local
firms in the required engineering disciplines. This is
important as it enabled the firm to maintain a permanent
team of design engineers and technicians. For example, if a
firm acquired the know-how (technology) for the design of
sewage treatment plants by means of any of the above
transfer mechanisms, it therefore tried to arrange to have a
stream of sewage treatment plant contracts to be designed by
its multi-functional engineers.
(b) The local firm should, in parallel with its acquisition of
know-how, transform its organizational structure into that
of an institution which provided its engineers with the
incentives to make their careers at the firm.
(c) In its pursuit of design assignments, the local firm must
have given more importance and weight to the acquisition of
know-how, to building teams of design engineers, and the
establishment of a sound professional reputation than to the
aspect of profit or return on investment. In other words,
the firm must have had a long term view of its operations
rather than a short term one.
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As the development programs of the Middle Eastern countries were
being implemented throughout the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, especially
in the oil producing countries, the number of local/regional engineering
consulting firms had increased to the extent that, by the early 1980's,
it has become extremely difficult to maintain satisfactory quality and
professional standards and at the same time remain relatively
competitive. This situation was even made more acute by the fact that
the number of international design firms competing for design
assignments in the Middle East had reached a total of 87 out of the top
200 international design firms in 1989, according to Engineering News
Record (ENR) special report. The influx of the international design
firms into the oil and non-oil producing Middle Eastern countries
suddenly increased soon after the 1973 oil crisis.
It is noteworthy that the drop in oil prices that took place in
1982, and the recession that followed soon after in the oil producing
and importing countries adversely affected the engineering consulting
industry by making an already high competitive market into an extremely
competitive one.
With the exception of one firm, Firm A, none of the local/regional
engineering design firms, that have come to existence at various stages
in the last thirty five years, were able to establish permanent high
professional standards and a strong reputation across the Middle East.
Furthermore, none were able to acquire know-how in many engineering
disciplines so as to be able to call themselves truly multi-disciplinary
engineering consulting practice. Only Firm A was able to make it to the
ENR list of the top international design firms on a continuous basis.
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And only Firm A was able to make it to the ENR list of the top 10
consulting firms in the Middle East.
As one of the leading regional professional design firms, Firm A
was able to forecast the possible long-term negative effects of such a
competitive atmosphere on its ability to acquire new and more
sophisticated know-how as well as on its ability to increase its
horizontal and vertical penetration of the engineering design market in
the Middle East. Also, this firm had always adopted a basic, simple
strategy that called for differentiating its technical competence on a
continuous basis as a means of gaining competitive advantages in
relation to its varied competitors. In light of these forecasts and in
order to maintain its ability to acquire new technologies as well as to
ensure continuous flow of design work for its highly experienced
personnel, this firm adopted and implemented a long-term strategy for
its operations that was implemented in the following stages:
(a) By the early 1970's, Firm A started to implement an
aggressive plan to expand business operations into new
geographic markets outside the Middle East. North and West
Africa, with concentration on oil producing countries in
these regions such as Algeria and Nigeria were targeted.
(b) For the purpose of securing work on projects where
competition was not as severe as in other engineering fields
as well as for acquiring know-how (technology) in more
sophisticated engineering fields, the firm opened a
satellite design office by mid-1975 in London. This office
was mainly staffed by highly qualified U.K. engineers with
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expertise and experience in engineering fields that were
lacking in the Middle East and other areas of operations.
For example, engineers were recruited to set-up tunnel,
geotechnical, bridges, urban transport systems, and town
planning departments. Also, this satellite office was
expected to diffuse and help transfer the new know-how
(technology) in these fields to all design offices of the
firm in the Middle East.
(c) Firm A implemented a policy of actively promoting the firm's
qualifications and capabilities to the many regional and
international financing agencies for the purpose of securing
assignments from these agencies in the firm's areas of
operations. Work on assignments for the World Bank was
particularly instrumental in the acquisition of technology.
(d) For the purpose of having direct connection and access to
the know-how (technology) markets, Firm A initiated a
program of acquiring design firms in the developed world.
The countries that were on top of the list for acquisition
of firms were the U.S.A. and the U.K.
By the end of the year 1990, this firm had already acquired two
engineering consulting firms in the U.S.A. and one firm in the U.K.
The two acquired U.S. firms have their distinctive competence in
engineering disciplines that are also within the distinctive competence
of Firm A. The U.K. acquired firm has distinctive competencies in
engineering disciplines that Firm A does not have.
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It is therefore quite fitting to say that Firm A has become a
truly multi-national corporation (MNC) by the year 1991, with the
differentiating condition that the mother company of the MNC is an
engineering consulting firm from the developing countries, and the
subsidiaries are all in the developed countries.
Now as Firm A faces the decade of the 1990's and as it tries to
see beyond it to the next century, it realizes that it must overcome
many hurdles to ensure its continued growth, preserve its policy of
differentiated core competencies and above all maintain its
organizational and technical pioneering role in setting the standard for
the industry in the region. These hurdles include the formulation of
technology strategy, transfer and diffusion of this technology.
This research paper has been initiated with the objective of
identifying and defining the following as key elements of meeting the
challenges facing the firm:
a) The role that technology and its effective transfer
(diffusion) play in the strategy of a multi-national
engineering consulting firm from the developing countries.
b) New technology transfer mechanisms and their impact on the
organizational structure of the multi-national engineering
consulting firm from the developing countries.
Definitions
For the purpose of clarity and the avoidance of any unnecessary
ambiguity there is a need to define, as precisely as is possible, the
terms that will be used frequently in this paper. These terms are
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"engineering consulting firm", "international/multi-national engineering
consulting firm", "multi-disciplinary engineering consulting firm", and
"transfer of technology".
Engineering Consulting Firm
ENR's (ENR/April, 1990) special report on the top 500 design firms
identifies three types of design firms. These are:
(1) Engineers Constructors (EC),
(2) "pure" consulting engineers, and
(3) architect engineers.
The first type, EC, is very simply a contractor organization
(constructor) who has either the in house design capability to undertake
design assignments as required for its projects or owns/controls a
design subsidiary that undertakes design assignments for outside clients
in addition to the assignments it undertakes for its mother company.
Normally most of the companies in this type are turnkey
contractors as well as project and construction managers. Furthermore,
few of them are diversified into other industrial activities.
The other two types are to be considered as one type in this paper
including their sub-types like Engineer Architect, Consulting Engineer,
Architect, and Soil Engineer. This is the type that, in this paper, we
call the "engineering consulting firm". This type undertakes
assigrnments, directly for owners, that may span all the project stages
like pre-feasibility, feasibility and planning studies as well as
conceptual, preliminary and final engineering designs, preparation of
working drawings and specifications, preparation of tender documents,
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tender analysis and reports, supervision of construction or project
management, construction management, and the handing over and
commissioning formalities in all or any of the disciplines of
engineering like transportation, water supply, sewerage, waste, etc.
Also, engineering consulting firms are often considered as a viable and
important sub-sector of what the literature now calls the Professional
Service firms industry which may include sub-sectors like management
consulting firms as well as professional accounting firms. This type of
firm is either privately or publicly owned but is not owned by, nor has
it any interest in, a contracting company. n addition, engineering
consulting firms are, under certain contractual situations, expected to
be the fair arbitrator on contractual and technical issues between
owners and contractors (constructors).
International/Multi-national Engineering Consulting Firm
It is also important to define the entity known as the
international consulting engineering firm and highlight the main
difference between it and the multi-national engineering consulting
firm.
An international engineering consulting firm is a firm that has
operations in its domestic national market as well as field offices in
the surrounding regions or even field offices spread across the whole
world. For the purpose of this paper, the spread of a firm's operations
from its national market to regional and world markets makes it an
international firm but not a multi-national firm. In addition to its
field offices that it controls directly from its headquarters, the
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international engineering consulting firm may have satellite design
offices located in suitable regions and are also subject to direct
control from the headquarters.
The multi-national engineering consulting firm is a firm that
owns, or controls the majority of the ownership shares of a number of
other discrete consulting engineering firms in markets other than its
domestic or regional markets. These discrete firms have their own
names, reputations, goodwill and domestic, and possibly regional and
world markets. In most cases the relationship between the multi-
national engineering consulting firm and the other firms it owns is
strategic and long-term in nature while the relationship between an
international engineering consulting firm and its field offices goes
beyond that to the operational, functional and reporting nature. It is
therefore valid to consider that the multi-national engineering
consulting firm, as defined here, is a type of multi-national
enterprises (MNE) that the international management literature has
extensively modeled and researched.
It is noteworthy to say that "design firm" and engineering
consulting firm" have the same meaning in this research paper.
Multi-disciplinary Engineering Consulting Firm
Engineering consulting firms (design firms) in the Middle East,
and in this regard world wide, are initially established as an
engineering design practice in certain specific fields (disciplines) of
engineering. Frequently it is the discipline where high demand for
engineering services is generated by both the public and private sectors
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in the market. Also, it is usually the disciplines in which the
educational system is able to provide sufficient numbers of trained
professionals and technicians with a certain minimum academic and
professional standard.
As the engineering practice matures it starts to expand into
disciplines of engineering that are either sub-specialties of its
practice or very closely related to it. Furthermore, with time, a
mature practice that has established its reputation, formed a strong
organizational structure, and acquired the requisite financial resources
will start to expand its operations to offer engineering consulting
services in new fields that may be in demand in its market. Therefore,
an engineering consulting firm that offers complete engineering services
in more than one discipline is called an multi-disciplinary engineering
consulting firm.
For example, an engineering consulting firm may start as an
architectural practice and expand its operations, over the years, to
include other disciplines according to many possible scenarios. The
following is one possible scenario.
Step 1 An architecture practice: professional staff
mainly architects, technicians and draftsmen.
Step 2 * Bring in house other specialties that are
necessary as inputs for the architectural
practice.
2.a Structural Engineers
2.b Electrical Engineers
2.c Mechanical Engineers
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2.d Quantity Surveyors
2.e Interior Designers
2.f Landscape Architects
Step 3 The added specialties will, with time, develop
into distinct and viable departments offering
services to the basic business of the firm as
well as trying to offer services as prime movers
in their own discipline.
Therefore, in this phase the firm may have:
* Department of Structural Engineering
· Department of Electrical Engineering
a Interior Design Department
a Quantity Survey Department
* Department of Landscape Architecture
Step 4 The firm will either integrate vertically,
expand horizontally or both. Integrating
vertically could either be upstream by expanding
into town planning and urban design services or
downstream by offering services in project
management and supervision of construction.
Expanding horizontally could be in many
directions by adding new disciplines depending
on many factors, a few of which are market
demand, growth rate, and profitability of the
firm.
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Definitioan of Transfer of Technology
For the purposes of this research paper phrases like "diffusion of
knowledge", and "acquisition of know-how" will have the same definition
as the phrase "transfer of technology", and as such, they will be used
interchangeably in this text. Before defining "transfer of technology"
as it will be used in this paper, its definition in various professional
sources should be identified.
The "Handbook for Professional Managers" (Britel and Ramsey, 1985)
defines technology transfer as:
"the process by which technology is conveyed from one
geographic area of field of activity to another. When such
transfer occurs across national boundaries, it is an
international transfer of technology. Technology consists
of society's pool of knowledge. It is made up of (1)
knowledge concerning physical and social phenomena and (2)
knowledge regarding the application of basic principles to
practical work. Although the distinction between science
and technology is imprecise, most authorities agree that
science involves understanding whereas technology involves
use."
The Handbook indicates that there is a diffusion process that
usually starts soon after the innovation process has been completed and
a product has been introduced. Furthermore, the rate of diffusion
varies depending on the expected profitability of the product (process)
and the amount of investment required to introduce the process.
The types of technology transfer as defined by the Handbook are as
follows:
"vertical transfer occurs when information is transferred
between basic research and applied research, between applied
research and development and between development and
production. Horizontal transfer occurs when technology used
in one place, organization, or context is transferred and
used in another place, organization, or context. Material
transfer consists of the export of a new material or product
by one country to another. Design transfer consists of the
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transfer of dsigns, blueprints, and the ability to
manufacture the new material or product in the recipient
country. Capacity transfer occurs when the capacity to
adapt the new item to local conditions is transferred."
The "AMA Management Handbook" (William K. Fallon, Editor, 1983)
treats technology transfer only from the point of view of technology
management which concentrates on the activities within a research
laboratory or between research laboratories of the same or different
organizations. It does not, however, address technology transfer as an
issue when the technology leaves the laboratory as an innovation that
will be converted into a process for manufacturing.
Finally, in "The New Palgrave A Dictionary of Economics" (1987)
technology transfer is recognized as an important factor in the economic
growth process of both developed and developing countries. Such growth
is greatly affected by the efficiency of the transfer while the
mechanism of the transfer process is not explicitly defined, various
economic models that were the main reasons behind modes of transfer in
the past are identified.
It is readily apparent from the quoted literature that transfer of
technology is primarily thought of and defined as mainly a tangible
process for manufacturing a product. It does not try to define the
transfer process when it involves intangible and tangible processes in a
service industry like the engineering consulting firm.
Therefore, it is necessary to define transfer of technology as a
process in the engineering consulting industry while making use of the
terminology used by Britel and Ramsey for the types of technology
transfers. As such, our definition of transfer of technology is the
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capacity, design and horizontal transfer of engineering knowledge,
experience, codes, standards, tested and economical design methodologies
and best common practices related to a certain field or discipline of
engineering from one engineering organization to another. This transfer
process between organizations takes place within, as well as, across
national borders. Transfer across national borders is called
international transfer of technology.
Implicit in our definition of transfer of technology is the
requirement that the receiver organization satisfy the necessary
condition of having a team of highly qualified engineers in the basic
engineering science in the various engineering disciplines. For
example, it is a necessary condition that an electrical engineer in the
receiving organization who is involved in the transfer process be a
highly qualified and fully accredited engineer in general and basic
electrical engineering science.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter will present a review of the literature on MNCs
during the past two decades. The literature review will attempt to
highlight the evolution in the theory of MNCs from a concern with
strategic control by headquarters to a concern of coordination between
headquarters and subsidiaries. Additionally, the evolution of the
organizational model of MNCs will be presented. The additional factors
which need to be considered by the MNC operating in the developing
countries are also reviewed and presented. In addition, this chapter
will present a review of the literature on the need of engineering and
construction firms to globalize.
Broad Strategic Issues Facing MNCs
Yves L. Doz (1980), in a Sloan Management Review article,
highlighted the evolution of MNCs over the decade of the seventies.
This evolution, according to Doz, was characterized by the conflict
between what he called the economic and the political imperatives. The
response of MNCs to this conflict varied from one MNC to another. Some
companies chose to respond to the economic imperative by adopting a
regional and/or worldwide business strategy that integrated and
centrally managed activities in various countries. Other companies
chose to give the dominant role to the political imperative, and thus
they adopted strategies that let their subsidiaries adjust to the
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demands of host governments. Still others chose a strategy of
compromise between the economic and the political imperatives.
Companies that adopted the regional/worldwide integration strategy
were able to achieve improved international competitiveness as well as
substantial cost advantage over competitors. These firms were even able
to afford the cost of "good citizenship" because of the higher internal
efficiency that they achieved.
Companies that chose to respond to the political imperative at the
expense of the economic imperative ended up performing their business
planning and strategies as if they were national companies. For this
reason, Doz calls this adopted strategy the "National Responsiveness
Strategy." These nationally responsive subsidiaries of the MNC enjoyed
four distinct advantages over their purely national competitors:
(1) pooling of financial risk;
(2) spreading of R&D costs over larger sales volume;
(3) increased success in export marketing as a
result of coordination; and
(4) transfer of specific skills between subsidiaries
such as process technologies and marketing
methods.
It is very important, however, to note that the know-how and other
specialized resources of the headquarters or other subsidiaries are
usually requested by the national subsidiary on a discretionary basis,
without allowing Headquarters to have any substantial influence in this
regard.
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Finally, companies that adopted a strategy of compromise between
the two imperatives were, in effect, choosing to have no strategy at all
and thus to deal with each strategic decision on its own. In other
words, their strategy was formulated as a series of independent and
unrelated decisions taken incrementally, that may or may not have made
sense over the long run. Each decision was taken in light of the
perceived importance of shifts, changes, and expected trends in the
political and economic environment. For this reason Doz calls this the
"administrative coordination strategy," and it is more similar to public
administration than is the classical strategic planning approach.
It is important to note that the administrative coordination
strategy provides the company with an "external flexibility" that
enables it to adjust and align itself with the uncertainties of the
environment. This external flexibility can be thought of as a trade-off
for the internal efficiency achieved as a result of adopting the
regional/worldwide integration strategy.
Doz draws the interesting conclusion that during the technology
diffusion or technology transfer process within an MNC, there will
always be a tilt towards integrative policies and strategies due to
increased pressure for coordination among subsidiaries. Even companies
that adopted administrative coordination strategies have been noticed to
tilt their administrative coordination towards more integration during
the technology diffusion stage of their evolution.
Furthermore, he found that integrative strategies were usually
adopted whenever a move towards higher or new technologies was taken by
an MNC, resulting in a more multi-nationally integrated and centrally
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managed corporation. Also, moves to higher or new technologies
resulted, in most instances, in an increased minimum efficiency scale as
well as in a demand for personnel trained in the new technologies. This
in turn contributed to a competitive advantage for the integrated
company. Such advantage was always used to increase market share by the
integrated MNC at the expense of the national and smaller companies.
Strategic Control in MNCs
C.K. Prahalad and Yves L. Doz (1981a and 1981b) have contributed
two articles to the Sloan Management Review (HB) on the subject of
strategic control in MNCs: "An Approach to Strategic Control in MNCs,"
and "Headquarters' Influence and Strategic Control in MNCs." These
authors have also elaborated on this issue of strategic control in MNCs
in their joint book, titled The Multinational Mission (1987).
According to Prahalad and Doz, strategic control in MNCs is an
issue that interests many groups of people. The most important of these
is the group consisting of top managers, who are becoming increasingly
interested in being assured that the strategic direction or orientation
of their subsidiaries is being controlled by the Headquarters of the
MNC. This need for assurance is resulting from the fact that a
considerable portion of the assets, sales, and profits of these
corporations are attributable to the subsidiaries as well as from a
trend of increasing size and scope of the operations of these
subsidiaries in MNCs.
The need to exercise strategic control was increased in the 1970's
by the adoption of global strategies by many MNCs, creating a need to
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influence the strategies of subsidiaries in order to assure harmony with
the global strategy of Headquarters.
Strategic control is defined by Prahalad and Doz as the "extent of
influence that a head office has over a subsidiary concerning decisions
that affect subsidiary strategy." They add that the head office of any
MNC would be interested in influencing strategic decisions of its
subsidiaries, as well as in monitoring progress and results towards
realizing the strategic objectives. These authors argue that as
subsidiaries mature they become autonomous with respect to strategic
resources, and consequently the control power of Headquarters over
subsidiaries will become considerably reduced. Strategic resources have
been defined by them as technology, capital, management, and access to
markets, and their application in influencing subsidiary strategy has
been called substantive control.
Faced with the reduced effectiveness of applying substantive
controls to influence strategies of mature subsidiaries, headquarters
had to resort to other mechanisms or tools to achieve the required
extent and nature of control. These new mechanism took the shape of a
sophisticated organization, which is in effect a blending or a
combinational use of organization structure, information systems, career
planning, and promotion of common organizational culture. The
organizational context is a subtle control mechanism that enables
Headquarters to monitor and control the strategy of its subsidiaries.
To illustrate the relationship between substantive control use,
organizational context control use, and the dynamics of strategic
control processes for subsidiaries of MNCs, these authors presented a
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schematic representation of shifts on control mechanisms in HQ-
Subsidiary relationships (see Figure 1).
As is apparent from Figure 1, the ability of Headquarters to
influence the strategy of a subsidiary by using substantive control is
reduced as the subsidiary matures. This is illustrated by the declining
line SS,.
It can be seen from Figure 1 that organizational context control
will be increasingly demanded by Headquarters as a substitute for
substantive control as subsidiaries mature and move from the left to the
right of the figure, as illustrated by the rising line O01.
The area between lines MM and SS1 is defined as the control gap
and it usually takes place when Headquarters depends only on substantive
control mechanisms to influence the strategy of its subsidiaries. The
ideal situation, according to Prahalad and Doz, is achieved by the use
of a combination of substantive control and organizational context
control mechanisms which will enable Headquarters to retain control as
illustrated by line MM1, i.e. the absence of a control gap.
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Prahalad, C. K. and Yves L. Doz, "An Approach To
Strategic Control In MNCs", Sloan Management Review,
Summer, 1981.
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Source:
An organization is considered to be an aggregation of four
orientations, cognitive, strategic, power, and administrative. Prahalad
and Doz have identified the types of organizational context mechanisms
that will enable managers at Headquarters to manipulate the four
orientations for the purpose of strategic control. These types of
mechanism are discussed below, but first it is appropriate to present a
schematic representation of what is called the strategic control dilemma
in MNCs (see Figure 2).
According to the matrix in Figure 2, MNCs can be categorized into
four types in relation to the aspect of strategic control and the
resulting combinational use of substantive and organizational context
control mechanism. These categories are:
(a) Fragmented. The dependence of subsidiaries on headquarters
for strategic resources is low and the sophistication of top
management in using organizational context control is also
low. In such a situation it is extremely difficult for
Headquarters to coordinate or influence the strategy of its
subsidiary, and the MNC tends usually to move this
subsidiary to quadrant B, or possibly divest it.
(b) Dependent. This relates to quadrant D, where the dependence
of the subsidiaries on Headquarters for strategic resources
is high but the sophistication of top management in using
organizational context control is low. This is usually the
case when all the sophisticated technology required for the
business is under the control of Headquarters. As the
business of the subsidiary matures there will be a strong
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tendency to shift to quadrant C, where the control
relationships will be those of a fragmented category.
(c) Autonomous. The dependence of the subsidiary on
Headquarters for strategic resources is low or, possibly,
the subsidiary is self-sufficient in this respect.
Furthermore, the sophistication of top management in using
organizational context control mechanisms is high. It is
believed that MNCs in this category will attempt to move in
the direction of quadrant A, i.e. integrated state.
(d) InteraLtd. The dependence of the subsidiary on
Headquarters for strategic resources, as well as the
sophistication of Headquarters in using organizational
context control, are both high. It is apparent that the
ideal state for strategic control by Headquarters of an MNC
is in quadrant A.
The types of mechanisms that Prahalad and Doz list as
tools to help Headquarters achieve the required strategic
control over subsidiaries as well as to help in the
transition or strategic redirection of strategies from
national and/or regional to global are: (1) data
management; (2) manager management mechanisms; and (3)
conflict resolution mechanisms. Each of these three
mechanisms has its own attributes. The proper and patient
use of these mechanisms and their attributes will help
Headquarters to develop its control capability.
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FIGURE 2
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The development of this control capability is a three-stage process, as
illustrated in Figure 3. These stages are: (1) variety generation, (2)
power shift, and (3) refocusing.
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Finally, it is important to mention that due to the incremental
nature of the application of mechanisms to gain strategic control the
change process is usually slow and lends itself to periodic revaluation
to ensure its harmony and fit with the changing political and economic
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imperatives or environments. Under all circumstances the change process
can succeed only if it establishes the legitimacy for change.
Evolution of the Organizational Model of MNCs
The large transformation in the international business environment
that took place in the late 1970's, and throughout the eighties has
created a considerable force for change in the organizational models of
various MNCs. This changing international business environment, as well
as the resulting changes in the organizational models of MNCs, was the
subject of Bartlett and Ghoshal's, Managing Across Borders (1989). This
book is based on a research effort that spans almost a decade, plus over
two years of extensive study of a diverse group of companies with
worldwide operations. Top management in the MNCs studied had no great
difficulty in identifying and understanding the environmental changes
that were taking place in their international businesses, nor the
required strategic response that they are expected to take. Their
challenge was to develop the proper and efficient organizational
capability and structure best suited to implement the intended strategic
responses. In other words, the strategic analysis was appropriate and
valid, but the failures and disappointments that had taken place were
due primarily to the inability of the organizational structure in place
to perform the required new functions and deliver a capability that
would improve the global competitiveness of the MNC. The need to
rethink the organizational structures of MNCs was not an isolated
phenomenon associated with one specific corporation or even industry,
but was a need that spread in most companies across industries.
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It is important here, before listing and explaining the various
organizational models that have existed and those that are evolving, to
explain further the need for this organizational structure change.
According to Bartlett and Ghoshal, worldwide industries are
characterized by three strategic competencies: Responsiveness;
Efficiency; and Transfer of Knowledge and Competencies. Multinational
corporations have always been successful if they possessed a strategic
competency that is identical with the dominant strategic competency of
its industry. In the 1980's this unidimensional strategic competency
requirement and its fit with the dominant strategic competency of the
industry began to show its shortcoming in enhancing the global
competitiveness of MNCs. In the late eighties, successful corporations
had to be capable of competing on a multidimensional strategic
competency basis, and this, they discovered, could be achieved only
through a change of organizational structure.
Bartlett and Ghoshal reminded managers of the need for taking the
administrative heritage of their corporations into careful consideration
when planning such organizational changes, as this heritage could prove
to be an asset or an impediment to the change process, depending upon
the way it is treated. This administrative heritage has shown great
influence on structure and capability of organizations. Furthermore,
strategy and organizational structure must always have a perfect fit in
order for the strategy to succeed.
These authors warn organizations against the possibility of
forgetting where they are coming from while implementing changes, since
remembering where you are coming from is requisite for reaching your
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objective. Administrative heritage could be defined as the combination
of assets, configuration of the company, distribution of
responsibilities, values that have been ingrained in the organization
over time, dominant management style as well as the most important
element, the role of founders or key executives, their priorities, and
their preferred strategic direction. In addition, the impact of
national culture in shaping organizational structure and processes has
also to be taken into account. It is therefore advisable that managers
involved with planning and implementing organizational changes be aware
of the importance of sensitivity in dealing with their organization's
administrative heritage, and be willing to give it the time and patience
necessary for success.
Against this background, Bartlett and Ghoshal classify worldwide
corporations into three models, and identified a new emerging model that
started to evolve in the late 1980s. The three models are:
(1) multinational; (2) global; and (3) international, while the new
emerging model they have called the transnational corporation. Each of
these models is identified with a specific structural configuration,
administrative processes, and management mentalities.
The following is a brief description of these models.
(a) Multinational Organizational Model. This is assumed to be
the first and is probably the most widespread among the
models identified. Bartlett and Ghoshal define the
multinational organization as a "decentralized federation of
assets and responsibilities, a management process defined by
simple financial control systems overlaid on informal
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personal coordination, and a dominant strategic mentality
that viewed the company's worldwide operations as a
portfolio of national businesses." (See Figure 4.) The
administrative processes that are associated with this model
are simple financial systems and controls for the purpose of
consolidation of accounts and dividend payments (if any),
while the management mentality looks at the whole operation
as the management of a portfolio of independent businesses.
The mission of each independent business is simply to
improve its competitive position in its market, be it
national or regional. Personal relationships between top
management and managers of subsidiaries are the vehicle by
which control and coordination with subsidiaries once took
place. In other words, this model is characterized by
personal and informal contacts rather than structure and
systems..
The structural configuration of this model is
characterized by a weak center and independent subsidiaries.
It is therefore truly multinational, since each unit is a
national unit that is operating independently as a business
within a portfolio. The businesses in the portfolio could
be related or diversified businesses.
(b) Global Organization Model. This model is virtually the
direct opposite of a multinational model. It is
characterized by a centrally controlled global strategy
where subsidiaries are expected to implement policies and
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plans developed at headquarters. These subsidiaries are not
capable of adopting their own strategies and do not possess
the freedom to change or modify the strategies that
Headquarters imposes on them (see Figure 5). Bartlett and
Ghoshal call this structural configuration, where
headquarters controls all strategic assets and resources,
"centralized hub." The administrative process is therefore
one of tight control over completely dependent subsidiaries.
The management mentality in this model is one that sees the
world as one single global integrated market where
similarities are to be highlighted and differences are to be
ignored.
The flow of communication, know-how, and support in
this model is always one way, from headquarters to the
subsidiaries, and as such this model is always associated
with complex communication systems.
(c) International Organization Model. Having named the
multinational organization model as the decentralized
federation, Bartlett and Ghoshal named the international
organization model as the coordinated federation. Companies
that adopted this model had their main task to transfer
knowledge and expertise to their subsidiaries across the
world, especially to environments that are not developed in
the required technology (see Figure 6). In this coordinated
federation, subsidiaries were given the freedom to adapt
their own strategies and marketing plans, but as they had to
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depend on Headquarters for know-how and new processes, they
were readily accepting to submit for greater Headquarters
control and coordination. In other words, the structural
configuration of organizations adopting this model is
characterized by the subsidiary owning all of its assets,
resources, decisions, and responsibilities. All are
decentralized, while Headquarters retains overall control.
As for the administrative processes in this model, they are
characterized by sophisticated management systems with
overall corporate control and a great deal of delegation of
authority to the management of subsidiaries. The management
mentality of companies adopting this model is usually one
where Headquarters looks at their subsidiaries as secondary
in importance, with the primary purpose of existence to
leverage the capabilities and resources of their
extensively-developed market.
Before moving to the newly emerging transnational
corporation model the following two comparisons are
important:
(1) The global model has the strongest and most
strategically effective Headquarters among the three.
The Headquarters in the international model is second
with a reasonable amount of strategic control, and is
sufficiently effective. The multinational model is
last in which the Headquarters possesses minimal
control.
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(2) The multinational model is characterized by the
strongest and most strategically independent
subsidiaries, followed by the international model
where the subsidiaries are independent but still
accept Headquarters control. Last is the global
model, where subsidiaries assume practically no
strategic independence.
(d) Transnational Corporation -- The Emerging Model. As
indicated above, Bartlett and Ghoshel argue that during the
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1980's companies had been transforming their organizational
structure from the traditional multinational, global, or
international, toward the direction of the transnational
corporation model. This transformation was necessary for
these companies because they had to gain multidimensional
strategic competencies in order to preserve their overall
competitiveness. It was no longer possible for companies to
compete on the basis of unidimensional strategic competence
that is in harmony with the strategic competence of the
industry, as they did before the 1980's.
As indicated above, the global, multinational, and
international organizational models have been described as
centralized hub, decentralized federation, and coordinated
federation, while the authors describe the transnational
corporation model as the "integrated network" model (see
Figure 7).
The main utility of the transnational corporation model is that it
makes selective decisions regarding centralizing or decentralizing
operations. It makes the basic assumption that some resources are best
centralized at Headquarters, others are best located at subsidiaries,
and still others are best distributed among many subsidiaries. The
objective is always the leveraging of the corporations' strategic
competencies for the purpose of increased global competitiveness.
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Headquarters and subsidiaries are in effect an interdependent network of
units that is dispersed, coordinated, and flexible. Subsidiaries are
assigned roles that will serve the strategic objectives of the
corporation as a whole. For example, a subsidiary located in the center
of technological excellence may be assigned a role that will help it
exploit this knowledge and diffuse it through the worldwide operations
of the whole corporation. Also the transnational corporation model
assumes that the worldwide competitive environment in which corporations
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MTS
must survive requires cooperative resource sharing as well as
collaborative sharing of information and know-how.
Furthermore, subsidiaries in the integrated network model are not
considered as independent set-ups with their own strategic objectives,
nor as completely ependent units that are expected to execute the
strategies of Headquarters. The integrated network model assumes that
each subsidiary is a source of skills, capabilities, and knowledge that
must be put into use for the overall good of the corporation. Bartlett
says that in this model a creative subsidiary marketing group may be
given the lead role in developing worldwide marketing strategy for a
product or business. Under such arrangements, the subsidiary would be
considered to be the corporate center of competence for that specific
capability.
To carry this further, the transnational model tries to highlight
the basic assumption behind the integrated network, i.e. the
Headquarters and subsidiaries are in a strategic partnership where the
knowledge and capabilities of subsidiaries are vital to, and must be
exploited for, the corporation's ability to improve its global
competitiveness. The global scanning capabilities of subsidiaries for
new knowledge have been playing an increasing strategic role in
determining the competitiveness of corporations.
Bartlett and Ghoshal point out that the transnational organization
is more a question of management mentality than of structural
configuration. The transnational management must be aware of the
complex and diverse nature of its dynamic business environment and must
reflect this awareness in the design of an organizational context
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characterized by multidimensional perspectives, dispersed capabilities,
and flexible processes.
For the transnational corporation model to function properly as an
efficient integrated network, management must be able to sell its
corporate agenda to the key people in the organization. Bartlett and
Ghoshal call this task the "co-option process," and they claim that this
process has more powerful integrative effect on the organization than
does any other structure or system. The successful sale of the
corporate agenda will create in key people a commitment that will
translate itself into sharing the company's values and purposes as well
as identification with the goals and objectives of the corporation.
Finally, it will help create the necessary flexible coordination and
cooperation mentality between Headquarters and subsidiaries, which is
crucial for the success of the network.
Table 1 illustrates how the transnational corporation can possess
and compete based on the multidimensional strategic competencies. This
table lists each strategic competence with its corresponding
organizational characteristics as well as the management tasks that are
performed to ensure the proper functioning of each characteristic.
In addition, for the purposes of comparing the various
organizational characteristics of each model compared to the integrated
network model, Bartlett and Ghoshal have developed a table (see Table 2)
which is helpful and self-explanatory.
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TABLE 1
BUILDING AND MANAGING THE TRANSNATIONAL
Bartlett, Christopher A. and Sumantra Ghoshal,
Managing Across Borders, Harvard Business School
Press, 1989.
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Strategic Organizational Management
Capabilities Characteristics Tasks
Global Dispersed and Legitimizing
competitiveness interdependent assets diverse
and resources perspectives
and
capabilities
Multi-national Differentiated and Developing
flexibility specialized subsidiary multiple and
roles flexible
coordination
processes
Worldwide Joint development and Building shared
learning worldwide sharing of vision and
knowledge individual
commitment
Source:
In summary, according to Bartlett and Ghoshal, the transnational
model of integrated network possesses the strong attributes of each of
the traditional three models (multinational, global, and international),
as well as having the added advantage of enabling the corporation to
compete on the basis of multidimensional strategic competencies. This
is achieved through the dispersal of each of the various corporate
competencies to the center that is best suited for serving the
corporation as a whole and thus improving the overall global
competitiveness of the corporation. These corporate centers of
competence are extensively coordinated through the network that is
designed to have the flexibility to cater to any change in the business
environment, and thus in the required center of competence.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note the evolution of the theory
of MNC from the early 1980's to the beginning of the 1990's. At the
beginning of the 1980's MNC's, according to Doz and Prahalad, were
mainly concerned with strategic control by headquarters over
subsidiaries for the purpose of sustaining competitive advantage. For
the purpose of improving their competitive advantages in the 1990's,
Bartlett and Ghoshal maintain that, MNC's should be concerned mainly
with the broader issue of coordination rather than control.
Coordination between headquarters and subsidiaries as well
ascoordination of subsidiaries among themselves. This reflects the
extent to which global competition has intensified.
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Multinational Corporations and Multi-domestic/Global Industries
Michael Porter (1986) points out that international competition
varies in nature from industry to industry, and that "industries vary
along a spectrum from multi-domestic to global in their competitive
scope." Porter defines the multi-domestic industry as one where
competition in one country or region is independent of the competition
in other countries or regions. The competitive advantage of a
multinational corporation in a multi-domestic industry is therefore
country- or region-specific.
Porter points out that over the long run this is true even in
cases where a competitive advantage was generated on a one-time basis by
transfer of know-how from headquarters to subsidiaries. This deployment
of intangible assets serves only the long-run competitive position of
the subsidiary in the domestic market. His definition of the global
industry is the one where rivals competing against each other do so on a
worldwide basis rather than on the basis of individual domestic national
or regional markets. The competitive advantage of an MNC in a global
industry is not determined by the aggregate summation of its advantages
in separate domestic markets, but rather by the advantage it enjoys
across the linked domestic markets on a worldwide basis.
Porter then concludes that, based on this definition, MNCs in
multi-domestic industries should manage their subsidiaries on a
portfolio basis. These subsidiaries are to be independent in assets,
resources, and competitive strategies, for their domestic market. The
MWC would then have a country-centered strategy constituting the bulk of
its international strategy. The competitors of an MNC's subsidiary
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would then be a domestic company or another subsidiary of another MNC.
For MNCs in global industries, Porter says that they must manage their
worldwide subsidiaries on an integrative basis to capture the
competitive advantage resulting form ten linkage between domestic
markets. For this reason an MNC would most likely start globalizing
when it realizes that there is a competitive advantage in integrating
some or all activities on a worldwide basis. Activities are defined as
the various tangible and intangible tasks that the corporation must
undertake across the value chain.
Managing in Developing Countries
James E. Austin (1990) wrote his book, Managing in Developing
Countries, mainly for the benefit of managers and corporations that are
operating in the developed world and are planning to operate in
developing countries. Austin's objective was to help these managers
identify the specific environmental factors they must analyze and
manipulate when managing a business in the developing or least-developed
countries (LDCs). Austin's basic theoretical model is based on the
following major hypothesis:
(1) The environmental factors that impact any industry and firm
in an LDC are economic, political, cultural, and
demographic.
(2) The business environment in developing countries is shaped
by the developments and actions taking place at four
different levels: (a) the international, represented by the
type of relations that exist among countries concerned; (b)
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national, represented by the government strategies and
policies such as development plans, etc; (c) industry, which
represents the immediate environment of the firm; and (d)
the firm, which is represented by the strategies and
policies of the firm.
(3) Porter's "five forces" model is the best suited for industry
and competitive analysis provided it is modified to suit the
environmental situations of industries and firms in the
developing countries. This is called for because Porter's
model was developed for the markets of developed countries,
their industries, business mentalities, and systems.
(4) The required modifications for Porter's "five forces" model
are: (a) the addition of developing government plans and
policies as a new competitive force (mega-force) that
affects industries and their dynamics; (b) study and
evaluate the impact of each of the environmental factors
(economic, political, cultural, and demographic) on Porter's
five forces. Austin makes the point that each factor has an
identifiable impact on the competitive forces of the Porter
model.
Using the model described above, Austin identifies the major
institutional actors that must be studied while analyzing an LDC
industry. There are (a) state-owned enterprises, (b) local firms and
cooperatives, (c) business groups, (d) informal sector procedures, and
(e) multinational corporations.
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For the purposes of this research paper we must limit discussion
to the multinational corporations, specifically to Austin's account of
the various modes of technology transfer that usually take place in
these corporations.
According to Austin, technology, in terms of level, structure, and
flow, is one of several elements that constitute the economic factor.
In addition, the appropriate fit between the transferred technology and
LDC environment is a challenge that managers must try their best to
tackle .nd achieve. The most delicate aspect of technology transfer,
according to Austin, is the choice of process for use in this transfer.
The choice of one process over another is a matter that is closely
dependent on the objectives of the supplier and receiver of the
technology, as well as on the competitive situation in the industry
itself. The processes that Austin lists as mechanisms of direct
technology transfer to LDC are:
1. foreign direct investment,
2. licensing,
3. equipment import,
4. technical services and training,
5. public information,
6. education.
It is important to note here that training, according to Austin,
was "most effective when it was carried out as an integral part of the
production policy," and that it must be seen by employees as a
continuous activity that will accompany them all through their careers.
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Furthermore, successful MNCs are usually corporations that have been
involved with successful training programs.
To conclude, we can say that Austin has introduced four
environmental factors that must be studied in terms of their impact on
each of Porter's five competitive forces when analyzing industries and
firms in developing countries. Economics is one of these factors, with
technology being one of the main elements constituting the economic
factor. It follows, therefore, that technology and the way it is
transferred to developing countries and firms is a competitive force
that would contribute to competitive advantage.
Engineering and Construction Firms Need to Globalize
Fumio Sugimoto (1990), in his MIT School of Engineering PhD
thesis, confirmed the validity of the two propositions on which he based
his thesis, "Globalization of International Engineering and Construction
Firms for Building their Competitiveness." The first is that
international Engineering and Construction (E&C) firms and industry have
been increasingly global. The second is that E&C firms, by adopting
global strategies, do gain considerable competitive advantage.
Before proceeding further in highlighting the findings of
Sugimoto, it is appropriate to state his definition of what an E&C firm
consists of, as his definition has bearing on the subject of this
research paper. Sugimoto's definition of an E&C firm: "includes
contractors, engineering firms, and hybrids of contractors and
engineering firms, but not specialty contractors (subcontractors), pure
engineering design firms, or consultants specializing in narrow
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expertise." We shall later be discussing the implication of his
incorporation of engineering firms as one activity in the value chain of
his E&C firm. The "pure engineering design firms" which he has excluded
may have been those design firms, or rather offices, that limit their
scope of activities to the preparation of working drawings without
venturing into the upstream or downstream activities of the more
comprehensive engineering design firm.
According to Sugimoto, three elements define the globalization of
an E&C firm. These are geographic, internal, and external
globalization.
Geographic globalization is strictly related to the geographic
spread of the markets of the firm, and thus it s more or less a risk
reduction measure. The internal globalization is defined by the
competitive advantage gained through the configuration and coordination
of the various internal activities of the value chain of the firm. How
these activities are dispersed among the various markets of the firm,
and how they are coordinated, would then be the major concern. Finally,
the external globalization is defined by the competitive advantage
gained by configuration and coordination of the varied inputs to the E&C
firm across its markets. Sugimoto stresses the basic fact that
geographic globalization is concerned only with where the firm competes,
while the internal and external globalization are concerned with how the
firm competes. A firm that follows a geographic globalization is a
multi-domestic strategy firm. Such a firm cannot continue to be
competitive in today's business environment, either in the developed or
developing world. Firms that adopt internal and/or external
57
globalization are global strategy firms. The global strategies of these
firms could be simple, complex, or any point in between. The simple and
complex global firms are the type of E&C firms that are expected to be
successful.
For the purposes of this research, we would like to limit our
discussion to internal globalization. The geographic application is a
clear element for us, while external globalization is an element that is
important to a construction firm but is of limited relevance to an
international design firm, which is the subject of this paper.
As outlined above, Sugimoto's definition of internal globalization
includes the competitive advantage that could be gained through the
configuration and coordination of the various internal activities of the
value chain of the firm. The transfer and coordination of "firm-
specific knowledge" is one of the tasks that a global firm must perform
successfully for the purpose of gaining competitive advantage. His
definition of firm-specific knowledge is:
"pure scientific and engineering knowledge, project management
expertise, ways to achieve the excellent quality of services
essential to the firm's reputation, and all sorts of knowledge
which effectively differentiate the firm from another. The
ability of top management to run an international E&C business in
a profitable way falls into the category of firm-specific
knowledge."
Sugimoto highlights the need to transfer horizontally and vertically
firm-specific knowledge across the various geographic markets.
Furthermore, he stresses the importance of coordination and the fact
that it is very extensive in global firms. Also, as the firm-specific
knowledge is reshaped and improved due to gained experience, there will
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be a need for feedback and thus the existence of two-way coordination of
the internal flow of knowledge.
This section presented paraphrased and summarized the literature
on MNCs which is relevant to the subject of this research paper. The
following sections will present comments on the reviewed literature.
Comments on the Literature Review of Models and Theories on MNCs
The following are comments on the suitability of the models and
theories discussed in Chapter Two, for application in the case of an
multi-national design firm whose parent firm is from a developing
country and whose subsidiaries are in several developed countries.
The multi-national design firm from developing countries cannot
afford to adopt a broad functional strategy other than the
administrative coordination strategy for its operations in the
developing countries. This is true simply because it is sometimes more
advisable for this firm to give precedence to the political imperative
over the economic imperative, while at other times the opposite may be
the best course of action to choose. It may therefore be wise to have
no unified strategy that is applied uniformly in all cases and is wise
to have a flexible strategy such as the administrative coordination
strategy. For the operations in the developed countries, this firm can
of course opt for economic imperative as a functional strategy, and thus
have an integrative policy inasmuch as it does not conflict with its
strategies for developing countries.
Furthermore, Porter's theory that industries fall on a spectrum of
multi-domestic to global with respect to the nature of their
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international competition should not be interpreted as an either/or
situation. Industries, and for that matter firms in such industries,
can have a combination of competitive strategies that are designed to
strengthen and enhance the competitive advantage both in the global and
domestic markets. An multi--national design firm from a developing
country cannot survive in its local markets without a domestic
competitive strategy that is continuously strengthened by global
competitive strategies.
The models that have been presented and discussed, as well as the
theories that have been highlighted, have been developed from the
perspective of an MNC from the developed world with subsidiaries in the
developed and less-developed countries. Furthermore, these models and
theories make the implicit assumption that the Headquarters of the MNC
(center) is a strong entity that owns and controls all of the strategic
resources that are important and efficient tools for implementing
policies and strategies. This may not be the case for the multi-
national design firm from a developing country, since it may not own and
control all of these strategic resources. At best it may own some of
them for a limited period of time, the expiration of which the Corporate
Headquarters can only exercise the strategically simple and impotent
resource of ownership. It follows therefore that such a firm would be
wise not to build its control policy of its subsidiaries strictly on
substantive control, but rather from the start it must build its control
policy mainly on the organizational context control.
Firms from developing countries expand to become multi-national in
size and scope for reasons that are likely to be different from those
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that make a firm from developed countries expand to become multi-
national. It is therefore no surprise that we find differences in
strategies and priorities between these two kinds of firms, and
consequently different approaches to doing business. For example, a
firm from the developing countries may have transfer of technology to
its home operations as its main objective of becoming multi-national,
while this objective is highly improbable for a firm from a developed
country expanding into developing countries.
Bartlett and Ghoshal's transnational corporation model of
integrated network, where the various corporate centers of competence
are dispersed, coordinated, and flexible, may be the most suitable model
for the purposes of a multi-national design firm from the developing
world. However this model poses three issues that this design firm must
be aware of.
(1) The integrated network model requires an extensive amount of
coordination and information flow in all directions for the
efficient performance of any and all centers in the network.
Such coordination and information flow tasks are difficult
ones to design and even more so to implement and control.
(2) Because of the nature of how firms from developing countries
are formed and managed, the "administrative heritage" factor
is expected to play a role that is even more vital than the
role it usually plays in an MNC from the developed world.
In the developing countries even institutions are managed,
to some degree, as private ownerships by founders and/or
senior executives. For the transnational corporation model
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to succeed in this case, special attention and care should
be exercised to work within the administrative system rather
than outside it.
(3) The implementation of any global strategy by a multi-
national firm from developing countries have to be
incremental to allow the firm to evaluate the effects of the
frequent "environmental" changes on the strategy. Thus the
firms strategies have to be designed as flexible and dynamic
to facilitate possible strategic redirection resulting from
these "environmental" changes.
Comments on Sugimoto's Model of Globalization of E&C Firms
Sugimoto's objective was to prove that in today's business world,
successful E&C firms are not the ones that only spread their activities
geographically across the world, but are the ones that globalized
internally by coordinating and integrating the activities of their value
chains across their worldwide markets, externally by coordinating all
inputs to the firm. His mention of firm-specific knowledge that must be
acquired as a important activity that must be carefully coordinated,
transferred, and updated, is perfectly accurate, but he fails to
identify sophisticated mechanisms through which firm-specific knowledge
is transferred and internalized across various centers other than the
standardized and simple mechanisms such as telephone, telefax, or
computer link. The more sophisticated mechanisms are those that
facilitate the transfer of technical common practice or a large body of
technical systems and methodologies from one set-up to another.
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Also, it is important to note that Sugimoto's global E&C firm
model is first based on Porter's theory of global industries and firms
and on his model of the configuration and coordination of activities in
the value chain, and second it is parallel and basically in harmony with
Bartlett and Ghoshal's transnational corporation model.
Sugimoto's model uses a hypothetical E&C firm that has the
following as its primary activities:
1. Project formulation
2. Feasibility studies
3. Basic planning
4. Financial arrangements
5. Practical designs
6. Establishing specifications
7. Estimate
8. Construction approval
9. Procurement
10. Construction
11. Final inspections
12. Training of personnel
13. Operation
An E&C firms or organization that can perform all of these
activities could be a turnkey contractor or a developer with either in-
house design capabilities or is in the habit of subcontracting design
activities to a design firm (i.e. engineering and/or architectural
consulting firm). Furthermore, such an organization may completely own,
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or be an equity partner in, a design firm that performs all of the
design activities.
The multi-national engineering consulting firm that is the subject
of this research is an independent design firm that is not owned by
developers or contractors. It is the design firm that is assigned by
the owner of the project to perform all of the preconstruction
activities, including design as well as the supervision of the
construction and post-construction activities that are carried by the
contractor and/or subcontractors. In other words, it is the second
party in a three-party relationship constituted by owner, design firm
(consultants) and contractor.
This distinction is important because the factors involved in
developing the global strategy of a design firm, including transfer of
firm-specific knowledge, may be different from those for a contractor or
a turnkey contractor.
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CHAPTER THREE
ENGINEERING CONSULTING INDUSTRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AN INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
This chapter will analyze the engineering consulting industry in
the Middle East. This analysis will help us determine the nature of the
competition in this industry and the underlying profit potential. In
addition, the analysis will also help in identifying the possible
strategies that a firm in this industry could adopt for the purpose of
achieving growth and competing effectively.
Michael E. Porter (1980) gives a working definition for an
industry as "the group of firms producing products that are close
substitutes for each other". For the analysis of industries he uses a
model (Figure 8) which has become known as Porter's five forces
framework for industry and competitive analysis. Porter's model will be
used in the analysis of the engineering consulting industry in the
Middle East because it provides a suitable theoretical framework for
analyzing a service industry such as the one at hand. Michael Porter
(1980) says that the goal of competitive strategy of a business in an
industry is to:
"find a position in the industry where the company can best defend
itself against these competitive forces or can influence them in
its favor. Since the collective strength of the forces may well
be painfully apparent to all competitors, the key for developing
strategy is to delve below the surface and analyze the sources of
each. Knowledge of these underlying sources of competitive
pressure highlights the critical strength and weaknesses of the
company, animates its positioning in its industry, clarifies the
areas where strategic changes may yield the greatest payoff, and
highlights the areas where industry trends promise to hold the
greatest significance as either opportunities or threats."
65
FIGURE 8
THREAT OF
NEW ENTRANTS
BARGAINING
POWER OF
SUPPUERS
BARGAINING
POWER OF
BUYERS
THREAT OF
SUBSTITUTEDDRnr IT(ra
OR SERVICES
PORTER'S FRAMEWORK FOR INDUSTRY AND
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
rce: Porter, Michael E., Competitive Strategy, 1980.
66
POTENTIAL
ENTRANTS
SUPPLIER
INDUSTRY
COMPETITORS
RIVALRY AMONG
EXISTING FIRMS
BUYERS
SUBSTITUTES
Soul
-
i M MI ~ MB ~
With this framework in mind and before we proceed with the
analysis of each of the forces it is important to note that the analysis
of an industry is interested in the long run effect and interplay of the
five forces in Porter's model and is not interested in the short run
factors that may affect industry competition and profitability in a
transient manner, such as sudden spurts in demand.
For the analysis to be comprehensive and complete, the engineering
consulting industry in the Middle East is defined as including all local
and regional engineering consulting firms as well as the international
or multi-national engineering consulting firms that have current
operations in the region. The analysis will also note the possible
potential increase in the participation of international and multi-
national engineering consulting firms within the industry due to
possible future implementation of national or regional development
projects which require expertise in engineering disciplines that the
industry can not supply.
It follows, therefore, that in this industry there are some
engineering disciplines for which the majority of the firms can offer
professional services and there are other engineering disciplines for
which the majority of the firms are neither professionally nor
experience wise capable of offering services. For the purpose of this
research the terminology used in the business life cycle concept will be
borrowed to differentiate between the two kinds of engineering
disciplines discussed above. Thus, those engineering disciplines for
which the majority of the firms can offer professional services will be
called "mature", and those engineering disciplines for which the
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majority is not capable of offering professional services will be called
"embryonic". For example, engineering services for the design of
residential buildings would be considered as a "mature" discipline while
engineering services for the design of a complex and large medical
center is an embryonic discipline.
The long run effect with which this analysis is concerned will
have to be measured over a time span of at least eight years into the
future. It is also a reasonable period for any strategic posture taken
by the firms in industry to begin to show significant impact on the
industry.
The following sample statistics show an increase in the number of
engineering consulting offices for a three countries in the region and
serve as a background for the industry analysis.
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Number of Registered Firms
Country 1970 1 975 1980 1985 1990 1
Saudi Arabia (Source: Chamber of Commerce Publication)
engineering consulting firms 7 31 108 272 320
other engineering consulting 5 30 116 277 423
offices (specialized)
Bahrain (Source: Firm A estimates)
engineering consulting firms 16 71 73 70 82
other engineering consulting NA NA NA NA NA
offices (specialized)
Egypt (Source: Firm A estimates)
engineering consulting firms NA 6 32 93 195
other engineering consulting NA NA NA NA NA
offices (specialized) _"~~~~~ _ iJ 
Threats of New Entrants
New entrants to an industry usually cause an increase in the
capacity of the industry. This increase in capacity and entrants'
eagerness to gain market share will cause the profitability of firms in
the industry to decrease considerably. The threat of entry to an
industry depends on the extent of barriers to entry, which are very low
in the least technically demanding engineering services of the spectrum
of the engineering consulting services like architecture, conventional
buildings with simple structures, etc. Barriers to entry in the
technically demanding engineering services are normally hign as the
competition would then have to depend on proven expertise of the
technical personnel, past experience in the design of similar projects
as well as the financial, managerial and administrative capability to
undertake large and complex projects. Barriers to entry in the
engineering consulting field are not many. The first is product
differentiation which is expressed in terms of the advantage of being
first in the industry in the region, customer service and customer
loyalty. The second barrier to entry is the learning or experience
curve effect. This barrier is effective only in the early stages of the
evolution of the engineering discipline in the area. As the discipline
moves from one stage to another in its life cycle and since experience
and knowledge in this field are not proprietary, the barrier becomes
successively lower until there is negligible barrier to entry for a
firm. Therefore, threat of new entrants is, as expected, inversely
proportional to the height of barriers to entry into the industry, which
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are in turn directly proportional to the technical complexity of the
engineering assignment and/or project.
New entrants to the engineering consulting industry in the Middle
East are usually of the following types:
(a) Private, individual engineering consultants who are often
professors at schools of engineering in the Universities
across the Middle East.
(b) Groups of experienced engineers working for an engineering
consulting firm who decide to establish their own
independent practice. In these cases they normally
capitalize on their professional work on the firms project
and on their good relations with some of the firm's clients.
(c) Local engineering consulting firms that come into existence
due to some discriminatory government regulation in a
country where there is demand for engineering services.
Some of these firms are professional and serious and some
are no more than an agency operation.
(d) Multi-national or foreign engineering consulting firms who
move into the area to perform work on projects that are part
of a bilateral government technical assistance program. In
most cases such firms will decide to become active
participants in the market in the country or region of entry
thus increasing industry capacity and reducing
profitability.
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Rivalry Among Existing Firms
Competitive moves by one firm within an industry will eventually
be felt and noticed by all of the firms in the industry. Firms affected
by such competitive moves will have to respond by taking similar or
maybe more drastic counter moves. Porter calls this phenomena as "Firms
are mutually dependant". Porter describes this pattern of action and
reaction as on that:
"may or may not leave the initiating firm and the industry
as a whole better off if moves and countermoves escalate,
then all firms in the industry may suffer and be worse off
than before. Some forms of competition, notably price
competition, are highly unstable and quite likely to leave
the entire industry worse off from the standpoint of
profitability."
In the Middle East, rivalry among existing firms in the
engineering consulting fields has become very intense due to three main
factors. The first factor is that almost all of the engineering
consulting firms in the area are intensely competing in an already
mature industry consisting of conventional engineering disciplines. The
industry has over capacity. A second and related factor is that the
development programs that have been implemented to date have
concentrated on building and enhancing infrastructure and services that
utilize the conventional and by now mature engineering disciplines. In
certain aspects the whole exercise resembles a market share game since
the industry growth is slow or erratic. The third factor is related to
the industry's clients. In the developed world, factors like a firm's
past experience, the experience and qualifications of technical
personnel, and it's technical approach for tackling the specific design
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problem, are given more weight in the award of engineering services
contracts to firms than the price offer. In other words, the basis of
competition is basically technical rather than financial. This is
usually justified by the fact that engineering services are normally a
small percentage of the total cost of construction while awarding the
assignment to technically un-qualified firms may result in mistakes,
deficient designs and increased cost of construction which may be many
times more expensive than the saving, obtained by awarding services to
the lowest bidder.
This professional approach is not always the case in the Middle
East especially in the mature engineering disciplines. Clients in the
public sector allocate the biggest attention to the price factor in
their evaluation of bids for engineering services. It is noteworthy
that regional and international financing agencies follow the
international approach for award of engineering assignments in the area
but the volume of work generated by these agencies is negligible
compared with that of the public sector clients in the area. This
industry is characterized by very low entry barriers as well as low exit
barriers in the mature disciplines since the amount of capital
investment required to set up a practice and maintain it for a
reasonable period of time is small compared to other businesses in other
industries. Later in this chapter the ways in which a firm can reduce
the effect of rivalry on its operations will be investigated.
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Threat of Substitute Services
Porter says the following about the threat of substitutes:
"substitutes limit the potential returns of an industry by
placing a ceiling on the prices firms in the industry can
profitably charge. The more attractive the price
performance alternative offered by substitute, the firmer
the lid on industry profits."
He adds that "substitutes not only limit profits in normal times,
but they also reduce the bonanza an industry can reap in boom times."
This is conceptually true in the case of engineering services in the
Middle East.
There are many parties in the area experimenting with various
formats that could develop in the future into serious substitutes to the
engineering consulting firms. These substitutes, if successful, would
capture a share of the engineering services market and would result in
increased competition among firms and eventually have a negative effect
on the profitability of the industry. It is noteworthy to remind
ourselves that this is certainly the case in the conventional and mature
disciplines of the engineering services.
The various experiments in substitute engineering services in the
Middle East are listed below:
a) Experts seconded to Middle Eastern governments by either
international financing agencies or bilateral government
technical assistance programs. Usually such experts have a
brief for training local government professionals in
performing comprehensive and complete engineering design and
services. The success of such programs has yet to be
determined.
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b) As a result of employment policies of many governments in
the area, there is over-staffing in almost all government
departments including those departments that are related to
engineering services as well as public construction. In
general these departments are staffed by inexperienced and
experienced professionals.
These departments undertake engineering design and
services in two different modes. The first mode is in
disciplines that they feel they can perform all the services
without having to request the input of any expert outside of
the government department. Examples of this mode are the
design of an elementary school or the design of a water
distribution network for a small village. The second mode
is to seek the help of engineering consulting firms by
requesting them to second experienced staff in fields of
expertise that they think they lack. In most cases the
engineering firm assumes no professional responsibility for
the finished product and is paid for the actual man/months
spent by its staff on the project.
For projects that are considerably more complex and
sophisticated than their current in-house capability can
handle, the departments request the engineering firms to
assume the professional and managerial responsibility for
the project, perform the work at the department offices or
in offices provided by the department, and use staff that
are mostly from the department with the senior staff being
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from the consulting firm. This mode of performing
engineering services being embraced by an increasing number
of government departments across the region but has yet to
prove that it is efficient, cost saving and contributes to
the training of government personnel. It also remains to be
proven that by having the government department staff
participate in the design team they will eventually be
better able to operate and maintain the project facilities.
Few government departments in the region have actually
started to compete by seeking engineering consulting
assignments in their field from potential clients in the
region. These departments are not usually as cost driven as
the majority of the firms in the market because they
consider the bulk of their costs as sunk costs. In
addition, they are capitalizing on the fact that their
design teams have the benefit of the operation and
maintenance experience.
c) Contractors, local and/or international, taking a proactive
role in identifying projects and executing them on a turn-
key basis including financing and design and construction
documents. Usually such contractors will end up integrating
backwards by creating full design units within their
organizations or by entering into strategic alliances with
more than one engineering consulting firm. In such
alliances the engineering consulting firm will not enjoy all
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the professional privileges that it did when it operated as
an independent entity.
Bargaining Power of Suppliers
Suppliers to any industry will have bargaining power only if they
are "powerful suppliers". According to Porter, "powerful suppliers can
thereby squeeze profitability out of industry unable to recover cost
increases in its own prices."
Suppliers to the engineering consulting industry are not powerful.
These suppliers are mainly the specialized sub-consulting offices and
the pool of fresh and experienced engineers from which the firms in the
industry will recruit.
Examples of specialized sub-consulting offices are geotechnical
engineering consulting offices, fire fighting experts, crowd control
experts and topographical survey and mapping offices.
These suppliers are not powerful due to four factors. The first
is that none of these suppliers is big enough to form a monopoly on the
services offered to the firms in the region. Many local and expatriate
offices and experts are actively competing to offer their services to
the industry. The second factor is the fact that although these
suppliers do supply services to other industries, their volume of work
with the engineering consulting industry is substantial and therefore
can not be put at risk. The third factor is the ability of a good
number of firms to integrate backward into the supplier's own industry.
This is a measure that suddenly seems inviting to a firm when realizes
that the suppliers services are over priced if it discovers that it can
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maintain a relatively constant supply of work. The fourth fact is the
relative inability of most suppliers to integrate forward into the
engineering consulting industry. Even if some do, it is usually a
short-lived and costly experience.
The pool of fresh and experienced engineers from which the firms
in the industry recruit is another type of supplier that is normally not
powerful. This is particularly true in the mature engineering
disciplines where the number of qualified fresh and experienced
engineers have more than saturated the market by sheer over supply. It
is noteworthy that in certain mature engineering disciplines there may
not be enough engineers with the required specific experience. Under
such circumstances, firms usually resort to recruitment of engineers who
are fully qualified in the basic engineering sciences and put them
through an extensive on-the-job in-house training program. The result
of such an approach is to bar engineers with the specific required
experience in a mature field from exercising any supply-driven power in
the relationship to the industry. An example of such engineers in the
mature disciplines would be those who have acquired good design
experience in urban transport systems.
Engineers, usually, enjoy the privilege of being powerful
suppliers to firms, if only for a relatively short period of time, if
they happen to have academic or work experience in a discipline that
suddenly becomes in demand across the industry. As indicated, the
powerful status is short lived since the industry will take measures to
ensure that increased supply will take place as quickly as possible.
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Bargaining Power of Buyers
For the purposes of this research we shall consider only two of
the many groups of buyers from the engineering consulting industry.
These are the public sector in various countries of the Middle East and
the regional and international financing agencies. The volume of work
undertaken by the firms for these two groups adds up to a high
percentage of the whole industry work load.
Porter has the following to say about the power of buyers.
"Buyers compete with the industry by forcing down prices,
bargaining for higher quality or more services, and playing
competitors against each other - all at the expense of
industry profitability."
The two buyer groups are very powerful for the simple reason that
they buy the majority of the services offered by the industry. One of
the reasons behind this acquired power is the fact that "switching
costs" to the buyer are practically not existent. A public department
or a financing agency will practically incur no costs if the second
design project it has is awarded to another firm. Another reason is the
fact that most public departments consider the services of the bidding
firms as standard and not differentiated services and therefore the
award decision is price dependent. Although financing agencies realize
that services of firms are differentiated and that award decisions
should give great weight to qualifications, they assume a passive role
in the award and decision making process.
On certain rare occasions, the services of engineering consulting
firms are treated as differentiated and the price aspect does not play a
decisive role. This is often the case when the required services are
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not in a mature discipline or when the project is of giant scale and
contains components that call for advanced and complex technology.
The third reason is that some of the buyers have the perceived
capacity and will to integrate backward and perform all or part of the
required engineering services. Some buyers, as indicated earlier, have
already moved in that direction by adopting a policy of "tapered
integration" which is defined as the production of part of the required
services. The fourth reason for the acquired power of buyers in the
Middle East is simply due to the design over capacity of the firms in
the industry.
Industry's Long Term Persoective
In the beginning of this chapter it was indicated that any
analysis of an industry must take the long term perspective into
consideration rather than the short term one. The industry analysis
just completed, according to Porter's five forces model, reflects the
status of the industry in the Middle East at the present time.
Therefore, the question that needs to be answered is what is the long
term perspective of this industry?
The following is a description, based on my experience, of the
industry future trends for the mature disciplines.
a) The industry will always be characterized by over capacity
and thus reduced profitability.
b) Engineering services will always be treated as standard, not
as differentiated services, and therefore prices will remain
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a governing factor in the award process. The lower the
price, the worse it is for the industry and its standards.
c) Threat of substitute will, if any, increase especially from
government technical departments as well as contractors
moving into the turn-key operations.
d) The fragmentation of the industry will further increase and
will result in reduced profitability. This means too many
small firms competing over continuously decreasing demand
for engineering services.
Before addressing the long term outlook of the industry in
offering engineering services in the embryonic disciplines it is
essential to consider the impact on the industry of a major event that
is taking place now in the region. This event is the war in the Gulf
which will have short and long term impact, in all the countries of the
region, on the political, social, economic, and business fronts
including the engineering consulting industry.
As soon as the war in the Gulf reaches a conclusion and the
reconstruction and development programs are initiated in Iraq, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, there will be a surge in demand for
engineering services in the mature disciplines. It is believed that in
terms of the long run industry structure this surge, although transient
in nature, will have possible negative long term effects on the
industry. This will mainly express itself in over capacity and will be
due to the expected increase in the number of engineering consulting
firms that are offering services in the mature disciplines. However, in
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the short run, this surge in demand will reduce over capacity and
improve the profitability of the industry.
Demand for engineering services in the embryonic disciplines, as a
result of the Gulf war, will contribute positively towards the strength
of the local/regional firms in the industry provided they have the right
strategic intent and have taken the suitable strategic posture.
Strategic intent is the long term vision, goals and aims that a
firm may have. Prahalad and Doz (1987) indicate that strategic intent
is very important because it makes the firm aim for goals that are long
term in nature and for which one can not plan since they go beyond any
reasonable planning horizons. Strategic intent may be considered the
"envelope" within which a firm's strategies and policies should fall.
Now, with or without the Gulf war, firms with the proper technical
capabilities to offer engineering services in any of the embryonic
disciplines that may be demanded will have a better competitive
environment in which to survive. This is due to the fact that embryonic
disciplines require a certain set of expertise and experience that is
only available at very few firms. These firms are in general foreign to
the region (i.e., not local/regional) and have a high cost structure
that is always translated into high fees. For example, firms which are
qualified to carry out complete and comprehensive design assignments of
large power generation plants or mass transit systems are both very
small in number and foreign to the Middle East. None of the local and
regional firms can effectively compete and eventually participate in the
design of such facilities because they lack the experience and know-how
to perform the assignment according to the required standard. Under
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such circumstances, the competition in the embryonic disciplines would
be restricted to a very small number of firms which have a joint
interest in keeping the design fees high. Therefore, for most of the
specific embryonic disciplines, the industry is characterized by under
capacity and more than average profitability. In fact such firms could
be considered as forming strategic groups within the industry in the
region. Each strategic group would form around one of the embryonic
disciplines. A firm could be a member of one or more strategic groups
depending on the number of embryonic disciplines in which it can
compete.
Porter (1980) defines strategic groups as "the group of firms in
an industry following the same or similar strategy along the strategic
dimensions." Strategic dimensions will, among other things, include the
core competence of the firm which is its expertise and firm-specific
experience in one or more embryonic discipline. Porter (1980) further
explains that the firms in strategic groups "generally resemble one
another closely in many ways besides their broad strategies. They tend
to have similar market shares and also to be affected by and respond
similarly to external events or competitive moves in the industry
because of their similar strategies."
Strategic groups erect entry barriers in the same manner and for
the same strategic objectives as do the firms in the industry as a
whole. Competence in the embryonic discipline and previous successful
experience in projects in this discipline are all entry barriers that
groups in this industry erect around themselves as a protection against
increased competition. This protection is against both firms from
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outside the industry that are planning to invest in it and from firms
within the industry that are planning strategic shifts from one group to
another.
It is therefore reasonable to say that firms whose strategic
intent is to join one or more of the strategic groups in the embryonic
disciplines must adopt the proper strategic plans, have the suitable
strategic resources and embark on the proper changes in their
organizational structures and cultures. In fact, I believe that such
firms have a fairly good opportunity to change the definition of the
industry in the region as well as cause a shift in the boundaries of
this industry to encompass new fields and disciplines.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NEW UNITED MOTORS MANUFACTURING, INC.
(NUMMI)
A GENERAL MOTORS/TOYOTA MOTOR JOINT VENTURE
A CASE STUDY IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
This chapter will present and highlight the NUMMI experience as a
successful new mechanism in the transfer of know-how (technology) from
one organization to another and from one part of the world to another.
NUMMI is a joint venture between General Motors (GM) and Toyota
Motor Corp (TMC) located in Fremont, California. It was established in
1984. Management of the operation and production of the cars, on behalf
of the joint venture, were the responsibility of Toyota. The stated
objective of the operation is "better automobiles at better prices" and
is based, according to Gordon, Kittredge, Matich and Murata (1987),
"on the following five essential ingredients:
· develop human potential
* pursue maximum productivity
* produce autos at low cost
* produce autos at high quality
· produce appealing automobiles"
NUMMI is to produce the Chevrolet Nova for GM and Corolla FX for Toyota.
Each of the partners to this joint venture had different
objectives behind joining it but the objectives of both were achieved
through a process of transfer of know-how (technology).
The pressure on North American car manufacturers to produce fuel
efficient cars as a result of the OPEC price increases starting in 1973
forced these manufacturers to change their adopted design and production
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philosophy in favor of a philosophy of producing cars that are fuel
efficient and compact. This philosophy change was made less difficult
to accept by the impressive market share increase that the Japanese made
cars were making in the U.S. car market. In addition, the American
consumers were switching to Japanese cars when they discovered that
these cars are not only small and fuel efficient but rather very well
designed, produced with the highest possible quality, technically far
more reliable and advanced than the American made cars, and selling at
very competitive prices. For GM, therefore, the objective of joining
Toyota in the NUMMI joint venture was the transfer of the Japanese know-
how of design and production of small cars to GM.
The objective of Toyota in joining GM as a partner in this venture
was simple. It needed to learn as much as it could about the
environment of industrial relations in the U.S. This need was felt by
Toyota because it was in the process of setting up independent
production facilities in North America that were to be operational soon.
In 1982, it was trying to decide whether to set up such facilities.
NUMMI gave it the experience it needed to decide to forge ahead.
It is important to note that Toyota opted for having production
facilities in the U.S. for two reasons. The first, and most important,
is the immense pressure that was being exercised by the U.S. auto makers
for government restrictions on auto imports from Japan. There was also
a fear that if imports are not restricted voluntarily by the Japanese
government and Japanese producers, trade barriers would be legislated
and placed into effect.
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The second reason was the cost advantage that could be achieved by
producing and selling in North America due to the appreciation of the
exchange rate of the Yen in relation to the US. dollar as well as the
fear that this appreciation was going to be a continuing trend. When
NUMMI was set up in 1982, the dollar was very strong and the Yen had not
yet appreciated.
What exactly did Toyota need to learn about the American
environment? Gordon, Kittredge, Matich and Murata (1987) in their study
of the NUMMI joint venture stress the fact that Toyota possesses a
production system that is considered one of the most developed systems
in the world. However, it was in need of certain "invisible assets"
that would ensure the success of its manufacturing operation in North
America. These assets are:
* "understanding the American worker/workforce
* understanding and developing a relationship with the UAW
* understanding and developing the U.S. supplier base
* developing improved relations with the U.S."
Also, the authors quoted the Japanese coordinator of NUMMI General
Affairs, giving the following explanation of why the joint venture was
formed. "The venture came about because Toyota had no experience with
the American worker, and to ease political tensions with the U.S.".
In addition, John Krafcik a G engineer who worked at NUMMI and
authored an MIT working paper titled Learning from NUMMI (1986),
identifies an additional environmental factor that Toyota learned about
and made use of in its North American plants. This factor is the
experience that the Toyota staff would gain by observing NUMMI
management interacting with U. S. local, state and federal government
regulatory agencies.
86
The NUMMI joint venture is a fixed time one which will expire,
according to Krafcik, by 1992. It appears that by 1992, the transfer
mechanisms would have been fully understood and efficiently used, the
"know-how" that needed to be effectively diffused from NUMMI to GM and
TMC would have taken place, and there would then be no further need for
the joint venture to exist. Krafcik talks of the prime objectives of
each party to the joint venture:
"opportunities to learn new methods or to apply old methods
in a new environment were the prime objectives of the
parties in the NUMMI venture".
Writing about the same subject but in the context of cooperative
strategies and organizational learning, D. Eleanor Westney mentions the
concept of internalizing new skills to the organization:
"The second type (of organizational learning) may also focus
on the production of a specific output, but it has the
additional goal of helping the firm to learn: to internalize
new skills, to refashion its procedures or structures. The
GM-Toyota joint venture to produce small cars in California
has the additional goal of helping GM learn how to produce
small cars efficiently and helping Toyota learn how to
manage a manufacturing operation in North America."
Internalizing new skills within an organization is the final stage
in the process of acquisition of know-how, since by internalizing skills
an organization must have added "value" to these skills to make them fit
the in house processes.
For the purposes of this research, the transfer mechanism that GM
set up within, and as part of NUMMI for the purpose of transferring the
Japanese know-how in the production of small cars to all GM plants
across the world is of great interest.
Krafcik says that the mechanisms used by GM and TMC were not
identical.
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"Given that Toyota knows the Toyota production system but
not North America, while GM knows the latter but not the
former, it is not surprising they have set up their
diffusion and learning procedures in different ways."
The transfer mechanisms that GM set up took into consideration
that NUMMI is an independent entity owned jointly by GM and TMC and that
the management responsibility is strictly the privilege of Toyota.
The first transfer mechanism was the most obvious and effective of
the three simultaneous mechanisms used by GM. This was the appointment
of young GM staff (middle managers) to work in all the departments of
the plant, which is managed by the Toyota team. The supervisory labor
force, including team leaders, group leaders, production engineers and
other production personnel as well as the young GM middle managers were
to be trained by the Japanese team at the same time as the production
was progressing normally. In addition, the entire labor force was the
same labor force that used to work in the same GM plant before the joint
venture was formed. The intent of GM is to transfer these personnel
after they have acquired the know-how by means of working together with
the Japanese for the required period of time. For example, the plan for
middle managers, according to Krafcik, was to have them transferred
after three years of work a NUMMI to GM plants across the world for the
purpose of "NUMMInizing" the production systems in these plants.
The second transfer mechanism was the setting up, by GM, of a
liaison office a few miles from the NUMMI plant. Krafcik describes the
function of this office as,
"serves as a mechanism for answering questions about NUMMI
originating anywhere within GM by identifying the
appropriate person in NUMMI to contact. The office is also
responsible for systematically examining NUMMI's management
techniques and distributing this information within GM."
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Krafcik notes that the distribution c information within GM has
taken place in three ways. The first was the production of videotapes
illustrating the NUMMI production methods. The second was the
distribution of a document explaining the Toyota production system that
is being applied at NUMMI. And the third was the creation of a computer
data base "containing myriad details on NUMMI which is accessible by
each GM plant." In addition, the GM liaison office was responsible for
arranging quick visits to the NUMMI plants by thousands of GM managers
and employees for the purpose of acquainting them with the now famous
and super-efficient Toyota production system.
The third and final transfer mechanism, was one that may prove to
be of real impact to the GM production system in the future. This
mechanism is the program where the graduate students on GM fellowships
in engineering and business schools in the west coast of the U.S. are
required to work three months during the summer on specific assignments
at NUMMI. These highly qualified, young GM staff members have not been
spoiled by previous work experience and would be therefore more open
minded toward learning new systems like that of the Toyota production
system.
Six years after the start of the NUMMI joint venture, verbal
reports from GM personnel who were familiar with the process indicated
that NUMMI as a concept has been successful. GM staff appointed to the
plant were able to acquire the know-how that GM hoped the joint venture
would provide. It is, however, the point of view of these GM personnel
that it is still premature to say if GM would be successful in diffusing
the know-how acquired by its NUMMI personnel to other GM plants. One of
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the problems they cite is the number of GM personnel that are being
trained is not large enough to have an impact on the huge GM
organization. Krafcik indicates that one possibility would be to
prioritize the diffusion process on a plant by plant basis rather than
spreading the trained personnel throughout all GM plants.
What is important with regard to this research is the fact that
the acquisition of know-how was successful. The extent of penetration
of the diffusion process is an issue that is case-specific to GM because
of its large size and geographic spread of its organization.
In a telephone conversation, Mr. David Werk of the GM Technical
Liaison Office at NUMMI confirmed to the writer that transferring the
Japanese know-how in designing and manufacturing small cars was, in
fact, one of the main objectives of GM for entering into this joint
venture. He also confirmed the success of the operation in transferring
Japanese know-how to GM both in the design and operational levels of the
business.
This case study indicates that transfer of know-how is best
achieved when it occurs simultaneously with the actual process of doing
the work. It indicates that this is particularly the case where the
transfer process involves an intangible product like design concepts,
production planning, coordination among huge numbers of activities and
above all, implementation of quality control and cost control systems.
GM was not only out to learn the production process of one car by means
of the Toyota production system, rather GM wanted to learn how to
produce its cars in the future in accordance with the seemingly superior
Japanese production system.
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If this were not the case, GM would have been satisfied with
sending a few engineers and foremen for training at a Toyota plant in
Japan where they could acquire the know-how and bring it back to GM in
the U.S. rather than setting up a production facility with its
competitor in its own home market. Furthermore, the apparent success of
this venture seems to indicate that acquiring new skills and
internalizing them to any organization is a process that is best
implemented when it gets the production team involved.
The relevance of this technology transfer mechanism to the case of
an engineering consulting firm is very clear. Although the case study
presents the experience of two manufacturing companies in transferring
technology across their organizations, the engineering consulting firm
can adapt and employ a similar mechanism for utilization in its service
industry organization. This is due to the fact that the mechanism
employed in NUMMI has proven to be successful as a process for
transferring intangible products like design concepts, codes, production
planning, coordination of large numbers of activities, and codes of
practice to large organizations. Any technology transfer process to an
engineering consulting firm is one that is mainly concerned with the
transfer, across organizations, of intangible products similar to those
in the NUMMI case study.
The nature and types of the adapted transfer mechanisms to be
employed by the engineering consulting firm will be presented in detail
in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
This chapter will identify and define the role of technology and
its effective transfer (diffusion) in the strategy of a multi-national
engineering consulting irm from the developing countries.
Additionally, it will present a theoretical framework for such a multi-
national firm to b followed by two transfer of technology mechanisms
which it can eploy for the purpose of transferring and internalizing
technology.
Role of Technology In The HNC
As indicated in the first chapter, one of the two main objectives
of this research paper is to identify and define the role that
technology and its effective transfer (diffusion) plays in the strategy
of a multi-national engineering consulting firm from the developing
countries (FIRM). It has become very clear from all of the reviewed
literature that technology is a key strategic resource that is extremely
vital for all MNCs in both the manufacturing and services sectors of he
developed world economies. It is apparent that technology is the
strategic resource that the MNCs depend upon the most to achieve their
objectives in global competition Also, the majority of the literature
indicates that the competitiveness of the MNCs is strongly related to
how effectively they transfer and diffuse their technology (know-how)
within their global network of subsidiaries. As indicated in chapter
two, most researchers of MNCs have identified the transfer and diffusion
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process as one of three fundamental strategic competencies at which a
MNC should excel.
The back drop to the theories and models is a MNC with
Headquarters and most of its subsidiaries located in centers of research
and technical excellence. Recent work on technology transfer within
MNCs has focused almost exclusively on the transfer process between
these centers. The classic theme of a technology transfer process from
parent firm to least technically capable subsidiary has received far
less attention recently although the process continues and has been
discussed extensively in earlier literature. In addition, this process
is usually restricted to the transfer of mostly mature technologies to
subsidiaries in developing countries in accordance with agreements
negotiated between the MNCs and the host developing countries. The
least attention in the literature has been paid to the situation of MNCs
from developing countries, which must enhance their technological
competencies by global technology strategies of a somewhat different
kind (i.e., transfer from subsidiary to parent company as a dominant
mode). However, the general model of the "New MNC" (Transnational
Model) and the requirements imposed by intensifying global competition
and increasing demand for local responsiveness and learning have broad
applications for developing country MNCs as well. It follows therefore
that technology as a strategic resource, that needs to be transferred to
the parent from subsidiaries, has a very basic and crucial role to play
in the strategy of the FIRM.
As indicated earlier, Bartlett and Ghoshal's transnational
corporation model is the most suitable model for the purposes of the
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FIRM. This is due to the fact that this model calls for the corporation
to operate as an integrated network of subsidiaries where the various
corporate centers of competence are dispersed, coordinated, and
flexible. The proper and successful performance of this model requires
the development of a new theoretical framework of the FIRM as a MNC.
This will be presented at length in the next section.
Theoretical Framework
In view of the preceding perspective of the current status of
literature on service industry MNCs whose parent firms are from the
developing countries, and due to the established strategic importance of
technology and its transfer to the FIRM, there is therefore, a need to
develop a new theoretical framework for such an MNC.
The theoretical framework of the FIRM has to take into
consideration certain important characteristics that are necessary for
the FIRM's successful performance.
These characteristics are listed as follows:
1) The owners of the FIRM must develop and articulate a
strategic intent that will serve to inspire all global,
domestic and other levels of strategies within the firm and
its subsidiaries. Such strategic intent will embody the
long-term vision, aims and goals of the owners and
especially those of the founder and his senior assistants.
It is absolutely necessary that this strategic intent be
communicated to all levels in the corporation. In addition,
when articulating this strategic intent the founder and his
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assistants must stress that from a global perspective the
firm is not a portfolio of independent businesses but rather
an integrated network of businesses that share a common
global strategy. Also, from a global perspective, this
integrated network of business is intended to enable the
FIRM to think globally and act locally.
2) The FIRM must have a global strategy that is formulated by a
mechanism of coordination and cooperation between corporate
headquarters and the subsidiaries.
This mechanism is required to facilitate the required
multi-dimensional approach to planning rather than a uni-
dimensional one which may not be internalized by the
executives of the subsidiaries of the FIRM. Parochial
perspectives and exclusive home country team mentality are
things that the FIRM must not allow to exist if it wants to
give its global strategy a chance to succeed. The purpose
is to end up with a global network of executives who are
sold on the strategic intent and are co-authors of the firms
global strategy. This global strategy must be developed in
light of and be in harmony with the strategic intent of the
FIRM.
Technologies (know-how) that are to be acquired in the
future by the FIRM should form a basic part of the global
strategy. Incremental implementation and periodic
evaluation of this global strategy should be a main feature.
The headquarters and subsidiaries will be expected to pool
95
their strategic resources and competencies for the purpose
of increasing the FIRM's global competitiveness. Again,
this strategy must be made known to the various levels of
senior and mid-level management in the corporation and it
must be sold to them by the "co-option" approach.
3) For facilitating the implementation and for the success of
it's global strategy, the FIRM must locate it's corporate
headquarters in such a location that can reflect the
aggregate of the c parative advantages of the locations of
all it's current and future subsidiaries. The global
strategic advantages that the FIRM acquires are a result of
the interplay between the comparative advantages of the
locations and the competitive advantages of each of the
subsidiaries.
4) The subsidiaries of the FIRM must each develop its own
domestic business strategy that suits its own market. Again
these strategies must be developed taking into consideration
that they should not conflict with the global strategy of
the FIRM. t is important to emphasize that the domestic
strategy of each subsidiary must be very responsive to the
market in which it operates be it national, regional or
international. Any conflict between the domestic strategy
of a subsidiary and the global strategy of the FIRM should
be studied and resolved by both the headquarters and the
subsidiary. In addition, the global strategy of the FIRM
and the domestic strategy of the subsidiaries are expected
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to work together to strengthen and enhance the competitive
advantage of the corporation both at the global and domestic
level.
5) For the purpose of successful implementation of the global
strategy of the FIRM, each of the developed world
subsidiaries has to have a core technical competence that is
unique within the FIRM. In other words, technical
competencies of the subsidiaries are preferred to be
complementary rather than supplementary. Other technical
competencies of the FIRM's developed world subsidiaries
could be similar to those of other subsidiaries if they are
required by the subsidiary for a successful implementation
of its domestic strategy.
6) Information Technology (IT) in the manufacturing as well as
the services industries is rapidly being transformed from a
convenient operational and cost saving tool to an asset that
plays a basic and important strategic role. It is expected,
therefore, that this integrated network FIRM study, plan and
implement an IT system that will integrate and tie together
all the technical data bases of all the subsidiaries. Such
an IT system will in no time be developed into and exploited
as a proprietary technical data base that contributes to the
competitive advantage of the FIRM and the subsidiaries. In
other words, this is one of the many possible ways that the
FIRM can leverage its distributed resources for giving
competitive advantage to its domestic and global operations.
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7) The FIRM's subsidiary in the developing countries must
develop a technology acquisition strategy. This strategy
must take into consideration the strategic intent of the
owners and the global strategy of the FIRM as well as its
own domestic strategy. Under all circumstances the strategy
has to develop rational answers to the following questions:
a. What are the current geographical boundaries of our
present market and where do we want these boundaries
to be five, ten and fifteen years from now?
b. What engineering disciplines are mature and what are
embryonic in the present market?
c. What engineering disciplines do we expect to be mature
and what do we expect to be embryonic in the market
five, ten and fifteen years from now?
d. What is the forecasted industry profitability for this
market in the mature as well as the embryonic
disciplines?
e. What are the mature engineering disciplines in which
we would expect to b offering services five, ten and
fifteen years from now?
f. What are the embryonic engineering disciplines in
which we would like to be offering services five, ten
and fifteen years from now? In other words, the
question is effectively about what strategic group or
groups we would like to join five, ten, and fifteen
years from now?
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Having developed rational answers for these questions,
particularly question (f), the developing country subsidiary would now
be in a position to identify the technologies that it needs to acquire
and transfer to its operations in five, ten, and fifteen years.
It is important to highlight that, all through this operation,
there is continuous feedback and consultation between the developing
country subsidiary and corporate headquarters in relation to the final
technologies of choice for each five year stage and to the program that
would be adopted for acquisition of the technology and for eventually
joining the related strategic group or groups.
8) Based on the developed global strategy in which a phased
program of technology internalization to the corporation and
technology transfer to the developing country subsidiary are
prime components, the FIRM will have to initiate a scanning
process for identifying developed country firms that possess
the required technologies. Having done that, the question
would then be a choice of one of the various types of
strategic alliances starting with acquisitions to equity
participation to joint ventures ....... etc.
The FIRM should, if financial conditions are suitable, seriously
consider a parallel long-term strategy component of affordable
investment in the form of equity participation in new ventures that
promise to develop into a successful engineering discipline at the
leading edge of technology. Success of such investments will contribute
a decisive competitive advantage to the firm in its global market as
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well as to the domestic markets of its developed and developing world
subsidiaries.
Finally, to conclude this section, we can say that the firm which
considers that technology is a prime strategic resource and that
transfer of this technology is a strategic competence that plays a
decisive role in competitively differentiating firms in the industry, is
a firm that stands a fairly good chance of having successful global and
domestic strategies.
Technology Transfer Mechanisms
The second objective of this research paper is to identify and
define the new transfer mechanisms and their impact on the
organizational structure of the multi-national engineering consulting
firm from the developing countries.
It bears repetition that technology transfer in the FIRM can be
affected through any of the mechanisms that were listed in the
introduction. It can also be affected by all of these mechanisms
operating simultaneously within the firm. However, the purpose of this
research paper is to identify and define new mechanisms that will be
able to affect technology transfer to the FIRM in general and to its
developing countries subsidiary in particular, when most or all of the
currently known mechanisms can not be made operational due to economic
and other reasons. Also, the new mechanisms are expected to enable the
FIRM to leverage its strategic resources through an effective transfer
of technology operations.
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As indicated by the NUMMI case study the transfer of technology as
defined in this research paper is best affected through a process like
the one implemented by GM and TMC at NUMMI. This is the mechanism that
best facilitates an efficient and effective on-the-job transfer of up to
date common practices, design methodologies and production systems to
large teams and across all levels of expertise. This mechanism, if
carefully adapted to the engineering consulting type of work, stands a
good chance of being successful in transferring a particular body of
knowledge to a complete design team. The adaptation and implementation
of a process of this nature in the FIRM is expected to be at least as
efficient as the one in NUMMI, if not more so. This is due to the fact
that this process would be taking place within businesses owned by the
same corporate entity, while in the case of NUMMI the process is taking
place in a business that is owned by two competing corporations with two
different and competing sets of global, domestic and business
strategies.
Therefore, two transfer mechanisms are proposed. The first
mechanism is designed for the purpose of transferring technology
possessed by any of the developed country subsidiaries to the parent
firm in the developing countries. This mechanism will cease to exist in
its conceived form when the transfer has been affected and the desired
know-how has been internalized by the parent firm. The second mechanism
is one that the FIRM will deploy to internalize new technology.
The following is a listing of the major steps to be taken to
establish each of the two mechanisms.
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First Mechanism for Transferring Internal Technologies
1. Establish a strong marketing team at the corporate
headquarters to promote and sell the competencies and
capabilities of the FIRM as a whole (parent and
subsidiaries). Priority should be given for obtaining
design assignments for the FIRM in projects that contain
components requiring design input in the fields of
technology that are desired to be transferred to the parent
firm in the developing countries. The global market will be
the field of operation for this team which will always be
guided by the FIRM's strategic intent and global strategy.
2. Establish a new entity, jointly owned by the corporate
headquarters, developing country subsidiary (parent firm)
and the developed country subsidiary that possesses the
desired technology (engineering discipline). The joint
ownership aspect is important to ensure genuine interest by
all parties that are needed for the technical as well as
business success of the entity. In addition, this aspect
resembles the successful ownership schemes that are employed
in the Japanese trading companies.
3. The new entity will establish its design and production
operations within, or close to, the parent firm operations.
It will be staffed by senior professionals in the required
number and expertise from the developed country subsidiary
while the rest of the team (engineers, technicians,
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draftsmen and support personnel) will be drawn from the pool
of permanent staff of the parent firm.
The continuous interaction between the members of this
team while performing their required tasks, will ensure the
effective and efficient transfer of the required know-how.
Of course, the management of the entity will develop
programs, and evaluation procedures for the transfer process
for the purpose of identifying and solving any problems that
may impede the process.
4. The technical management of this operation will be the
complete responsibility of the developed country subsidiary
while the financial and administrative management will be
the shared responsibility of the owners of the entity.
5. The marketing team at corporate headquarters and the
marketing teams of the parent firm will have to assume the
responsibility of arranging continuous flow of design
assignments for this entity. This is important for
achieving reasonable profitability for the entity and for
affecting the transfer of know-how in as short a period of
time as possible.
6. The parent firm, in conjunction with the corporate
headquarters, will have to evaluate the feasibility of
spinning off this entity to become an independent subsidiary
that is owned either by the corporation directly or is a
business unit wholly owned by the parent firm.
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It may prove most prudent and even advisable that the
entity be spun-off as a business unit owned by the parent
firm since it will have to share the geographic market and
coordinate its domestic strategy with the parent firm.
This methodology may be repeated with other
subsidiaries for affecting other transfers of know-how to
the parent firm in conjunction with its technology
acquisition strategy.
In addition to transfer of technology to the parent firm, there
are additional advantages resulting from of this mechanism. These are
as follows:
1. The domestic and regional markets of the developed country
subsidiary have not been encroached upon by the activities
of the new entity.
2. The developed country subsidiary has been given the
opportunity to make a profit out of the transfer process.
3. As a long-term outcome of this involvement, the developed
country subsidiary has now the long-term potential to expand
beyond its domestic and regional markets into the global
market.
Second Mechanism for Acquiring External Technologies
Before presenting the major steps required to establish the second
mechanism, it is appropriate to explain why the FIRM would need to adopt
it in the first place.
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The technology (know-how) that is effectively transferred by the
first mechanism is, in general, represented by an engineering discipline
of which the parent firm is in need for to increase its penetration of
current domestic/regional M!arkets. Also, it is usually an embryonic
discipline that is highly in demand and is substantially controlled by a
definite strategic group in the parent firm's market. Therefore the
first mechanism is a viable solution that is used to help the parent
firm increase its long-term growth potential and its profitability.
The reasons for employing the second mechanism are quite different
from those of the first mechanism. The second mechanism is used by the
firm to internalize engineering disciplines that are new to the
corporation as a whole. Often these new disciplines are global in scale
and scope. In addition, these disciplines require an effective and
collective leveraging of the core competencies of all subsidiaries in a
large MNC. In fact, "global disciplines" can only be internalized by a
global firm with a global strategy.
For example, a "global engineering discipline" might be the
planning and engineering skills and expertise that are required to
conceive, design, and implement a successful comprehensive
reconstruction program of a country or region destroyed by war or
earthquakes.
With this background in mind the following is a listing of the
major steps that are to be taken in establishing the second mechanism:
1. Establish a marketing team at corporate headquarters to
promote the corporation as a whole in this global market.
The marketing teams that are formed for the purposes of the
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first and second mechanisms could initially be composed of
one expanded team containing all the necessary superior
planning, technical and managerial skills necessary for
performing tasks required by both mechanisms. Staff
appointed to such a team should be drawn from the pool of
senior professionals across the entire FIRM. In addition to
their technical and professional skills, members of this
team must be fully convinced of the strategic intent and the
global strategy.
2. As stated above, the market in which this team will operate
is the global market. However, the global market must be
assumed as a final stage of a multi-stage marketing plan
that will be developed by the team. The marketing plan is
expected to give priority to, and concentrate on, the
geographic region in which the FIRM is best positioned to
take assignments in the "global discipline". In addition to
the marketing plan, the team must establish and operate a
scanning mechanism for identifying projects in the global
market especially those that could develop into a potential
project.
3. "Global disciplines" will in general require a global
outlook and approach in identifying the potential project
and in designing a package that will facilitate the award of
this project to the corporation. It _s, therefore, very
important that the marketing team gets to be very intimate
with the political, social, financial and legal factors that
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shape the environment of the project. Any proposal by the
marketing team has to be tailored in such a manner as to
mobilize these factors to work in favor of the corporation
obtaining the assignment.
4. The marketing team will establish its operation in the same
location of the corporate headquarters. This will provide
the team with the necessary global strategic advantages that
are mentioned in point No. 3 of the theoretical framework
section of this chapter. The team, in cooperation with the
subsidiaries, must design and produce promotional materials
that can highlight the individual strengths of the
subsidiaries and the resulting collective strengths and
advantages accruing to the corporation as a result of
adopting the integrated network corporate structure.
5. The corporate headquarters and the team will have to
investigate the possible need for a type of strategic
alliance with a firm that has core competencies that are
required for such "global disciplines" and are lacking
within the FIRM as a whole.
6. It is advisable, in the early stages, that assignments
awarded to the corporation be split among subsidiaries
according to the core competencies of each and in a manner
that preserves the efficiency of the operation without
affecting the quality of the product. However, careful
consideration must be given at the planning and conceptual
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design stages to the need of forming one working team from
the senior staff of the subsidiaries.
The corporation will have to consider the possibility
of setting up a new entity when the long-term viability of
the "global discipline" has been reasonably proven by the
corporate teams. Ownership in the new entity for all the
subsidiaries must be considered when the decision to create
it is made.
The new entity or subsidiary will be located in a
home-base that will provide it with the competitive and
differentiating productive advantage. This will include,
among other things, efficient communication infrastructure,
supply of wide range of trained professionals and
technicians, relatively low salaries and wages and long-term
stable economic and political environments. Of course, in
the early stages, the senior posts of this subsidiary will
have to be staffed by personnel drawn from other
subsidiaries in the FIRM.
7. As the FIRM wins assignments in these "global disciplines"
there will be a need for a core project management team to
be established in the same base as the marketing team. The
mandate of the core team will be to coordinate the work
among subsidiaries at the macro level to ensure general
compliance with programs and deadlines. The mandate will
also call for the core team to be responsible for overall
coordination with, and reporting to the client. Like the
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marketing team, the project management team must be
extremely mobile and as small as is practically possible.
8. The FIRM must adopt an integrated approach towards the
production aspect of the operation. This integrated
approach will have to be flexible to allow for local
exploitation of the core competencies of each subsidiary.
Therefore, production will take place in dispersed centers
but with efficient and lean production operations.
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